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INTRODUCTION

percent of women who are raped do not report the

experience to the police.'

They simply do not seek a legal remedy.

They understand the hard truth that state law and state actors-police,
prosecutors and judges-ordinarily provide no legal remedy for violence
that is motivated by gender animus.
In 1994, Congress tried to give women a remedy that did not rely on
state law and state actors when it enacted § 13981 of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA).2 This provision of VAWA gave women the opportunity to lodge civil complaints against their attackers in federal court if they
were subjected to criminal violence motivated by gender animus. In
United States v. Morrison,3 however, the United States Supreme Court struck
down the provision as unconstitutional. The Court declared that Congress
lacked the authority to enact § 13981 of VAWA under either the Commerce Clause or section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Article will not address the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
analysis in Morrison. Instead, the Article concentrates on the Supreme
Court's analysis of congressional authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that section 5 provided Congress
* Assistant Professor, Villanova University School of Law. B.A. University of
California at Santa Cruz, 1989; J.D. Yale Law School, 1994; LL.M. Georgetown
University Law Center, 1997. I would like to thank Frank Cooper, Ann Juliano,
Cathy Lanctot, Greg Magarian, Nazareth Pantaloni and Richard Turkington for
their insight and critique. Polly Hayes and Erik Williams provided excellent
research assistance. All errors are mine.
1. See NAT'L VICTIM CTR., RAPE IN AMERICA:

A REPORT TO THE NATION 5

(1992).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1998).
3. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).

(907)
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with no authority to enact § 13981 of VAWA primarily because the amendment reaches only actions committed by state officials, not the actions of
4
private individuals who commit violence against women.
The requirement of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the state action doctrine, has been subjected to significant scholarly criticism. Some academics argue that certain kinds of private action should
fall within the rubric of state action for purposes of the doctrine. 5 Others
have argued that the state action requirement should be abolished altogether. 6 Regardless of how persuasive one finds those arguments, one
need not adopt either of them in order to find § 13981 in VAWA
constitutional.
To understand the constitutionality of § 13981 in VAWA, one needs
to examine the scope of the constitutional violation at issue when states
4. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621 ("[A]ction inhibited by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the
States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful.") (citing Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 n.12
(1948)).
5. See, e.g., Alan R. Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment;
State Action, Federalism and Congress,59 Mo. L. REv. 499, 512 (1994) (suggesting that
Fourteenth Amendment should be read in conjunction with Privileges and Immunities Clause as creating state duty to intervene between private parties to protect
fundamental interests). Although the Fourteenth Amendment's explicit language
restricts the state from abridging these rights, Congress intended the amendment
to protect against private encroachment by opening federal courts to actions directly against private parties that violated the rights of individuals. See id. at 547
(stating primary purpose of amendment was to legitimate Civil Rights Act of 1866
which defined some fundamental rights). Congress may create a private cause of
action between private parties when, because the state is unwilling to protect the
interest, the Supreme Court's review of state actions would provide inadequate
protection. See id. (quoting and refuting dicta that states amendment "erects no
shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful") (citation omitted); see also RobertJ. Glennon,Jr. &John E. Nowak, A FunctionalAnalysis
of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 221, 231
(suggesting balancing test to weigh competing rights in context of Fourteenth
Amendment protection). If an alleged deprivation violates the amendment and
the deprivation occurs because the state maintains a legal system which legitimates
or tolerates the deprivation, the state can be said to have chosen the practice that
creates the deprivation as a superior right. See id. at 230 (noting method of state to
deprive person of right to due process). Confronted with this conflict, the court
must determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment dictates a preference for
one right over the other, i.e., the right to engage in the practice that causes the
deprivation over the right to be free from the deprivation. See id. at 221 (explaining appropriate inquiry); see also Charles L. Black,Jr., "State Action, "Equal Protection
and California'sProposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 70 (1967) (criticizing Supreme
Court's formulation of state action doctrine).
6. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 505
(1985) ("I suggest that it is time to begin rethinking state action. It is time to again
ask why infringements of the most basic values-speech, privacy, and equalityshould be tolerated just because the violator is a private entity rather than the
government."). See also Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on
Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. Rhv. 1296, 1297 (1982) (using natural law
theory to argue for abolition of state action requirement).
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address violence against women. Imagine an average rape victim. She is
drinking with friends at a party when an acquaintance gets her alone and
becomes sexually aggressive. 7 She begins to cry. Despite her tears and
repeated no's, he pins her down and rapes her. Like most rape victims,
she suffers little injury extrinsic to the rape itself.8 She has no bruises or
other corroborative evidence, but she wants to die inside. If she calls the
police, officials may disbelieve her and code the case as "unfounded" (a
false complaint).9 Or police may bury her complaint by logging it with a
non-criminal code, where it will receive little to no investigation.' 0 Police
also may encourage her to withdraw the complaint. If police do choose to
investigate and arrest her attacker, prosecutors nevertheless may choose
not to indict him because the victim failed to complain promptly enough,
failed to resist her attacker forcefully enough or failed to lead her prior
sexual life virtuously enough.11 These discretionary decisions by state actors have their roots in earlier statutes and the common law when corroboration, fresh complaint, utmost resistance and chastity on the part of the
victim were more formally required. If our hypothetical acquaintance
rape victim manages to make it to the trial stage of the process, she will be
subjected to cross examination that includes a detailed scrutiny of her
prior sexual history with the assailant offered to prove that she consented
and is now lying. Therefore, if this victim reports having been raped to
the police, she will be subjected to a humiliating process-the laws and
legal procedures that constitute what some scholars have called the "second rape." 12 Ordinarily, she also will receive no legal redress for the
wrong against her.13 On the other hand, if the victim does not report
having been raped to the police, she will receive rio legal redress, but she
will manage to avoid the penalties that often befall those who do report. It
is not surprising, therefore, that most victims do not report having been
raped to the police.
7. For a discussion of the prevalence of acquaintance rape, see infra notes 7176 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the non-physical harm caused by rape, see infra notes
77-84 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of "unfounding," see infra notes 116-36 and accompanying
text.
10. For a discussion of police discretion, see infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of prosecutorial discretion, see infra notes 146-61 and
accompanying text.
12. See LEE MADIGAN & NANCY GAMBLE, THE SECOND RAPE: SOCIETY'S CONTINUED BETRAYAL OF THE VICTIM (1991) (discussing theory of "second rape"); see also
MARTIN S. GREENBERG &

R.

BARRY RUBACK, AFTER THE CRIME: VICTIM DECISION

MAUNG 7 (1992) (describing "second injury" phenomenon). Unsympathetic justice officials and defense attorneys can exacerbate the stress and discomfort caused
by the initial victimization. See id. (discussing problems for victims reporting
cases).

13. For a discussion of rape victims' lack of legal redress, see infra notes 14770 and accompanying text.
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Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment says, "No state shall ... deny
4
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress "the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."15 Women's rights under section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment are violated
by states' unwillingness to provide women with equal legal protection
against violence that is motivated by gender animus. Section 1 affords wo16
men the right to be free from this kind of gender discrimination.
In response to states' pervasive and systematic denial of equal protection, women have little to no faith in the formal structures of police power
to remedy violence motivated by gender animus. As a result, the vast ma17
jority of women do not report to police when they are raped or battered.
Thus, the reality of state action extends beyond whether state actors respond poorly to any individual woman who alleges having been beaten or
raped. States in fact deter women from turning to their authority because
the protection they offer is unequal and often illusory.
The fact that state laws and procedures deter victims from reporting
has consequences for what remedies Congress is authorized to enact
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to enforce women's equal protection rights in this context. Because the states' denial of
equal protection inhibits women from reporting, reporting itself cannot
be a condition precedent to obtaining relief under section 5. When states'
laws and procedures deter women from reporting the violence they suffer,
states have acted to deny equal protection. Nevertheless, when a woman
does not report, there is no state actor she can sue for the equal protection violation.18 Congress should therefore be authorized under section 5
to remedy the violation of her equal protection rights by providing her
with the opportunity to make a civil claim against the individual who committed the crime motivated by gender animus. Only if section 5 autho14. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
gives Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of"
article I. Id.
16. For a discussion of the section 1 violation, see infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
17. Women who are battered likewise do not ordinarily report their violence
to the state. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
889 (1992) (noting district court's finding that secrecy typically shrouds abusive
families and that victims do not report abuse). "Researchers estimate that one in
every two women will be battered at some time in their life." Id. at 888.
18. Even if she could sue a state actor, it would be very difficult for her to
obtain relief under the relevant doctrines of § 1983.
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rizes this remedial help will the Fourteenth Amendment be able to
address state malfeasance regarding violence against women.
The argument here does not rely on a notion that the state is encouraging violence against women, although one could argue that states do
encourage it because they fail to prosecute it vigorously. The argument
does not depend on the notion that there is a symbiotic relationship between the private violence at issue here and state action, although one
could argue that there is in the case of violence against women. This argument assumes nothing new about how courts should measure a violation
of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in relation to violence against
women. Congress found that states deny women equal protection of the
law through state laws and the discretionary decisions and practices of
state actors, such as police, prosecutors and judges.' 9 What is new here is
an understanding of what section 5 authorizes once states' violations of
section 1 deter women from engaging the state altogether. Because rational actors do not choose to report to the state when to do so would be
futile, Congress is not limited under section 5 to remedying only those
cases in which women do report to the state. Rather, Congress has the
authority under section 5 to attack the real problem-the pervasive denial
of a legal remedy for women who suffer crimes motivated by gender animus. When states' violations of section 1 deter women from reporting,
Congress may provide a legal remedy in the form of civil claims against
private actors. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress
the "power to enforce by appropriate legislation," section l's commitment
to equal protection. 20 Section 13981 in VAWA is the most appropriate
legislation to enforce the provisions of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in this context.
Part II of this Article describes the Morrison facts and the Supreme
Court's analysis of the section 1 violation. 2 1 Part III reviews the full scope
of the section 1 violation, both historically and currently. 22 It argues that,
historically, explicit requirements in rape law evinced profound gender
bias and that, although those requirements have been formally abolished
in the past few decades, they continue to direct the discretionary decisions
of state actors. Specifically, as a result of the biased imperatives behind
the historical requirements in rape law, police disproportionately "un-

found" rape complaints, place the complaints in non-criminal codes and
discourage women from proceeding with their complaints. Additionally,
prosecutors disproportionately dismiss rape cases because of the same biased imperatives. As a result of anticipating futile and humiliating interac19. For a discussion of discretionary practices, see infra notes 116-81 and accompanying text.
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
21. For an examination of the facts in Morrison and the Supreme Court's section 1 analysis, see infra notes 25-66 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the historical and modern breadth of the section 1
violation, see infra notes 67-187 and accompanying text.
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tions with state actors if they do report, rape victims overwhelmingly do
not report the violence they suffer. Part IV examines the Supreme Court's
analysis of congressional authority under section 5 to enact the civil remedy provision in VAWA. 23 It argues that the Court misunderstood the full
scope of the section 1 violation and was thereby misguided in its analysis of
the appropriate, congruent and proportional remedial measures authorized under section 5 in response to it. Part V concludes that VAWA provides a congruent and proportional legal remedy to the Fourteenth
24
Amendment violations suffered by women.
II.

UNITED STATES

V. MORRISON

On September 21, 1994, Christy Brzonkala, a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), met Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, two Virginia Tech football players, in the dorm where she lived. 25
Shortly thereafter, Crawford left with one of Brzonkala's friends. Morrison immediately asked Brzonkala to have sexual intercourse with him.

She said "no." Morrison asked again, and again she said "no."'26
Brzonkala tried to leave the room, but "Morrison grabbed her, and threw
her, face-up, on a bed . . . he pushed her down by the shoulders and

disrobed her." 27 Brzonkala struggled to get free, but Morrison pinned her
with his arms and legs and forcibly raped her. 28 Before she could escape,
Crawford then entered the room, pinned Brzonkala with his arms and legs
and forcibly raped her. After Crawford had finished, Morrison then raped
Brzonkala a second time. Morrison warned Brzonkala after these three
rapes that she "better not have any fucking diseases." 29 In the following
months, Morrison boasted in the dorm dining hall that he "like[d] to get
girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them." 30
After this experience, Brzonkala's behavior changed dramatically.
She stopped attending classes, suffered depression and attempted suicide."1 One month after the rapes, Brzonkala disclosed to her roommate
23. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's section 5 analysis with regard to
VAWA, see infra notes 188-236 and accompanying text.
24. For an argument that VAWA provides a congruent and proportional legal
remedy to Fourteenth Amendment violations suffered by women, see infra note
237 and accompanying text.
25. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 953 (4th
Cir. 1997) (describing facts contained in Brzonkala's complaint).
26. See id. (explaining that Brzonkala twice refused Morrison's sexual
advances).
27. See id. (describing rape).
28. See id. (noting Brzonkala's non-consent).
29. Id.
30. !d.
31. See id. (describing Brzonkala's behavioral changes after incident with Morrison). Brzonkala sought treatment from a school psychiatrist who prescribed an
anti-depressant, but made only cursory attempts to discover the source of her depression. See id. (discussing Brzonkala's trauma and eventual withdrawal from
school).
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that she had been raped, but could not discuss the details of the experience. 32 Some months later, Brzonkala identified Morrison and Crawford
as her assailants by using the Virginia Tech football guide. She did not call
the police to report the crime, however, believing that "criminal prosecution was impossible because she had not preserved any physical evidence
33
of the rape."
In May of 1995, Brzonkala filed a rape complaint against Morrison
and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. Virginia Tech
officials did not report Brzonkala's rapes to the police because " [r] ape of a
female student by a male student is the only violent felony that Virginia
Tech authorities do not automatically report to the university or town podid not urge Brzonkala herlice."'34 Virginia Tech authorities additionally
35
self to report the rapes to the police.
Virginia Tech's Judicial Committee held a hearing on Brzonkala's
charges. At the hearing, Morrison admitted that, despite the fact that
Brzonkala twice told him "no," he proceeded to have intercourse with
her.36 Crawford denied having sexual intercourse with Brzonkala, but corroborated that Morrison did.37 Although the Committee found the evidence against Crawford insufficient, it found Morrison guilty of sexual
assault. 38 The Committee suspended Morrison for the Fall 1995 and
Spring 1996 semesters. Morrison appealed to the Dean of Students, who
affirmed the suspension and confirmed this decision in writing to
39
Brzonkala.
Morrison then threatened to sue the university. 40 The Dean of Students informed Brzonkala that, because Virginia Tech was unwilling to
defend Morrison's one-year suspension in court, the school had decided
to hold a second hearing on the charges. 41 The Dean assured Brzonkala
32. See id.
33. Id. at 954.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 603 (2000) ("Morrison admitted having sexual contact with her despite the fact that she had twice told him
'no.'").

37. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 954 (discussing assertion by Crawford's alibi witness-another Virginia Tech football player-that Crawford did not have intercourse with Brzonkala).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. (discussing denial of due process claims made against Virginia Tech
by Morrison's attorney).
41. See id. The school officials informed Brzonkala that "there might be merit
to Morrison's 'ex post facto' challenge that he was charged under a Sexual Assault
Policy that was not yet spelled out in the Student Handbook." Id. The officials also
told Brzonkala that the school would hold a second hearing, under the school's
previous Abusive Conduct Policy, because "Virginia Tech was unwilling to defend
the school's decision to suspend Morrison for a year in court." Id. Brzonkala was
told that the second hearing was "a mere technicality" because the officials "believed [Brzonkala's] story." Id. The second hearing turned out to be much more
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that this re-hearing was, a "mere technicality. ' 42 In preparation for the
second hearing, Virginia Tech officials gave the recordings and transcripts
of the first hearing to Morrison's attorney, but withheld them from
43
Brzonkala's attorney.
After the second hearing, the Committee found Morrison guilty of
"using abusive language," not sexual assault, and it re-imposed a suspension. 44 Morrison again appealed the suspension. 4 5 The Vice-President of
Virginia Tech then withdrew the punishment imposed, finding that it was
"excessive when compared with other cases where there has been a finding of a violation" of the student code of conduct. 46 The Vice-President
required, instead, that Morrison attend a one-hour educational session on
Virginia Tech's student policies. 47 There was no letter from Virginia Tech
officials this time informing Brzonkala of Virginia Tech's decision to set
than a "mere technicality;" it lasted more than twice as long as the first hearing and
required Brzonkala to provide and pay for her own attorney. See id. at 954-55 (discussing second hearing).
42. See id. at 954 (describing conversation between Dean and Brzonkala); see
also Margo L. Ely, Civil Rights Law Withstands Early ConstitutionalTest, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Feb. 9, 1998, at 6 (noting Dean's conversation with Brzonkala concerning
second hearing).
43. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d. at 955 (elaborating on Virginia Tech's cooperation with Morrison in preparation for second hearing). School officials informed
Morrison, with ample notice, that testimony from the first hearing would not be
admitted, that live witnesses or sworn affidavits were required at the second hearing and provided him with "complete and early access" to the tape recordings of
the first hearing. See id. (highlighting school's assistance to Morrison in preparation for second hearing). In contrast, Virginia Tech "belatedly" informed
Brzonkala that the testimony from the first hearing would be inadmissible. See id.
at 954-55 (indicating school's lack of assistance to Brzonkala in preparation for
second hearing). Because the second hearing took place during the summer,
Brzonkala did not have time to locate her witnesses or to produce sworn affidavits
from them. See id. at 955. Virginia Tech officials also prevented Brzonkala from
recounting her entire version of the assault; the school required her to leave out
any mention of Crawford because the charges against him had been dismissed in
the first hearing. See id. ("[A]s a result she had to present a truncated and unnatural version of the facts.").
44. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 603 (2000) ("This time, however, the description of Morrison's offense was, without explanation, changed
from 'sexual assault' to 'using abusive language.'"). Neither Brzonkala nor her
attorney knew of the reduction in charges against Morrison. See Brzonkala, 132
F.3d at 955-56 (discussing reduction of charges). Brzonkala learned of the "abusive language" charge through a newspaper article. See id.
45. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 955 ("He argued due process violation, the existence of new information, and the asserted harshness and arbitrariness of the sanction imposed on him as grounds for reversal of the judicial committee's
decision.").
46. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 603. Judge Mott criticized the Vice-President of Virginia Tech for "not elaborat[ing] on the 'other cases' to which she" compared
Morrison's punishment. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 955 (noting no cases cited).

47. See Morrison's Suspension Was For Abusive Language, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), Dec. 8, 1995, at C1 (defining "'deferred' suspension, meaning the suspension would take effect immediately if found guilty of another offense by the
[Virginia Tech] Judicial System").
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aside Morrison's suspension. In fact, Brzonkala learned that Morrison
would be returning to Virginia Tech on a full athletic scholarship from an
article in the Washington Post.48 Brzonkala did not return to Virginia Tech
49
that semester because she was afraid of running into Morrison.
In December of that year, Brzonkala sued Morrison and Crawford
under § 13981 of VAWA in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. 50 Brzonkala alleged that Morrison and Crawford
48. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 955 (stating that school withheld information
from Brzonkala, despite having kept her informed at every other step in process).
Virginia Tech officials declined to inform Brzonkala that Morrison's suspension
had been lifted and that he would be returning to campus for the fall semester. See
id. (detailing school's withholding of information). Brzonkala learned in an August 22, 1995 newspaper article that Morrison was returning to Virginia Tech to
play football. See id. Brzonkala did not learn until November 30, 1995, again
through a newspaper article, that the second school hearing found Morrison guilty
of the "reduced charge of 'using abusive language"' rather than "sexual assault."
Id. at 955. Despite the fact that the school officials who visited Brzonkala at her
home assured her that the second hearing would "address the 'sexual assault'
charge against Morrison, the administrators altered the charge." Id. at 955-56
(stating that school neglected to notify both Brzonkala and her attorney).
49. See id. (noting Brzonkala's fear for her safety because of threats and
school's treatment of Morrison). Brzonkala was dismayed that Morrison was able
to continue his education at Virginia Tech. See Morrison'sSuspension Was for Abusive
Language, supra note 47 (quoting Brzonkala, "[h]e's living his life like he wants to,
and I'm suffering").
After his suspension was deferred, Morrison returned to play football at Virginia Tech for the 1995 season. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 955 (discussing facts of
case). A highly recruited sophomore, Morrison later was suspended from the football team by the head coach "for failure to live up to the standards set for Virginia
Tech football players.'" Allison Blake, Tech Team Suspends 2 Players; Failure to Live
up to Standards, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Dec. 13, 1995, at Al (discussing
Morrison's subsequent arrest for public drunkenness and petty larceny); see also
Allison Blake, Athlete Finedfor BarIncident, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Feb. 16,
1996, at C3 [hereinafter Athlete Fined] (discussing charges of "petty larceny, destruction of property, public intoxication, and possession of false identification").
Morrison returned the money he removed from the bar's tip jar and participated
in an alcohol education program. See Athlete Fined, supra (discussing outcome of
case).
After Morrison was excluded from the Virginia Tech football team in March
1996, he transferred to Hampton University to finish his college football career.
See Ed Miller, Morrison Starts New Football Life at Hampton; The Linebacker Is Hoping to
Leave Troubled Past Behind, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), Aug. 29, 1997, at C8 (stating
that Virginia Tech coaches felt Morrison was "a victim of circumstances" who "deserved a second chance"). Morrison's second chance has proved successful; he
played the 2000 season in the professional Arena Football 2 League. SeeJeff Hartsell, Foxes Drop (Kick) a Close One, 39-38, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Apr.
23, 2000, at Cl (discussing Morrison's achievements in spring game).
50. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 956 (discussing procedural history of case). On
March 1, 1996, she amended her complaint. She alleged that Virginia Tech violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688
(1994), because of the university's faulty handling of the rape charges and its failure to punish the rapists in "any meaningful manner." See id. (describing
amended complaint and citing to 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994)). On May 7, 1996,
the district court dismissed the Title IX claims against Virginia Tech for a failure to
state a claim on which relief could be granted. See id. (citing Brzonkala v. Va.
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had subjected her to criminal violence motivated by gender animus and
she sought vindication of her rights under VAWA. 5 1 The United States
intervened to defend the constitutionality of the statute. 52 The district
court dismissed Brzonkala's claim on the ground that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting § 13981 of VAWA. 5 3 When
55
54
the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court agreed.
In enacting § 13981 of VAWA, Congress had relied on its power
under both the Commerce Clause 5 6 and section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 57 Many scholars have argued that Morrison marks a substanPolytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Va. 1996)). The district
court held, and the en banc court of appeals affirmed, that Brzonkala failed to
state a claim of disparate treatment under Title IX. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 604
n.2. The en banc court of appeals vacated the district court's dismissal of
Brzonkala's hostile environment claim against Virginia Tech pending a United
States Supreme Court decision on the same issue in a case in which the Court had
already granted certiorari. See id. Brzonkala eventually settled her case with Virginia Tech for $75,000. See Brooke A. Masters, 'No Winners' in Rape Lawsuit; Two
Students Forever Changed by Case That Went to the Supreme Court, WAsH-. POST, May 20,
2000, at METRO (describing settlement).
51. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 953-56 (discussing facts of Brzonkala's complaint). Because the case was decided on a motion to dismiss, the courts viewed
the facts alleged in Brzonkala's complaint as true. The United States Supreme
Court cited sparingly to Brzonkala's complaint for support of the factual allegations, drawing instead on Judge Mott's panel opinion in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Compare Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-06 (stating facts
and procedural history of case), with Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 953-56 (same).
52. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 604 (explaining procedural posture of case).
53. See id. at 604-05 (stating holding of lower court).
54. On December 23, 1997, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision regarding Brzonkala's
§ 13981 claim. See id. at 604-05 (stating the holding of the panel). The panel also
reinstated Brzonkala's Title IX hostile environment claim against Virginia Tech.
See id. (discussing holding of Fourth Circuit panel decision). An en banc court of
the Fourth Circuit then vacated the panel's decision, and on May 5, 1999, the en
banc court affirmed the district court's opinion that Brzonkala had stated a claim
under § 13981, but that Congress did not have the constitutional authority to enact that provision of VAWA. See id. at 604-05 (concluding that Brzonkala "stated a
claim under § 13981 because her complaint alleged a crime of violence and the
allegations of Morrison's crude and derogatory statements regarding his treatment
of women sufficiently indicated that his crime was motivated by gender animus").
The court then determined that Congress exceeded its authority under the Constitution when enacting a civil rights remedy against the private actors. See id. at 60405 (stating second holding of en banc court).
55. See id. at 627 (concluding that "Congress' power under § 5 does not extend to the enactment of § 13981").
56. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (defining Congress' power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes"). Congress expressly relied on the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (discussing Congress' claim of authority
to enact § 13981 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (a) (1998))).
57. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619 (noting
Congress' claim of authority under section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment). Section
13981 states:
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tive shift in Commerce Clause doctrine 58 and was wrongly decided under
the relevant precedent. 59 I agree with that view; however, I will set aside
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as
under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of this
part to protect the civil rights of victims of gender-motivated violence and
to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of
crimes of violence motivated by gender.
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (a) (1994).
58. After Morrison, rather than being able to regulate just about anything that
substantially affects interstate commerce, Congress is limited to regulating those
activities that are primarily economic in nature. Notice that violence against some
women is economic in nature. For example, violence against prostituted women
committed by pimps or johns during the course of business occurs in a setting
defined by an economic relationship between the parties. Studies indicate that
sixty-eight percent of prostitutes have been raped while working as prostitutes. See
Melissa Farley & Howard Barkan, Prostitution, Violence, and PosttraumaticStress Disorder, 27 WOMEN & HEALTH 37, 40-41 (1998). Of those who were raped, forty-eight
percent had been raped more than five times. See id. Eighty-two percent of prostitutes have been physically assaulted while working as prostitutes. See id. Forty-six
percent of those who report having been raped were raped by their customers. See
id. at 41. Interviews of 475 prostitutes in five countries (South Africa, Thailand,
Turkey, U.S.A. and Zambia) came to similar conclusions. See Melissa Farley et al.,
Prostitution in Five Countries: Violence and PosttraumaticStress Disorder, 8 FEMINISM &
PSYCHiOL. 405, 414 tbl. 4 (1998). Sixty-two percent report having been raped since
entering prostitution. See id. Of those who were raped, forty-six percent had been
raped more than five times. See id. Prostitution's effect on interstate commerce is
not insubstantial. Because prostitution is an economic activity, Congress could
regulate violence against prostituted women under the Commerce Clause, and it
might choose to do so because states rarely pursue criminal charges against those
who violate prostituted women.
59. See Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The
Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 15 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 257, 274-92
(2000) (discussing legislative history detailing congressional responses to constitutional challenges during passage of VAWA); Margaret A. Cain, Comment, The Civil
Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act: Its Legacy and Future, 34 TULSA L.J.
367, 399-407 (1999) (arguing that § 13981 is constitutional exercise of Congress'
Commerce Clause power); Christine M. Devey, Note, Commerce Clause, Enforcement
Clause, or Neither? The Constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act in Brzonkala
v. Morrison, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 567, 581-87 (2000) (arguing that § 13981 should
be upheld as valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power); Parker Douglas, Note, The Violence Against Women Act and Contemporary Commerce Power: Principled
Regulation and the Concerns of Federalism,1999 UTAH L. REV. 703, 722-53 (same); Sara
E. Kropf, Note, The Failure ofUnited States v. Lopez: Analyzing the Violence Against
Women Act, 8 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 373, 395412 (1999) (same);Judi L.
Lemos, Comment, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: Connecting Gender-Motivated Violence to Interstate Commerce, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1251, 1267-76 (1998)
(same); Peter J. Liuzzo, Comment, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State
University: The Constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act-Recognizing That
Violence Targeted at Women Affects Interstate Commerce, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 367, 385-93
(1997) (same); Charis Mincavage, Comment, Title III of the Violence Against Women
Act: Can It Survive a Commerce Clause Challenge in the Wake of United States v. Lopez?, 102 DICK. L. REv. 441, 459-70 (1998) (same); Megan Weinstein, Note, The
Violence Against Women Act After United States v. Lopez: Defending the Act from ConstitutionalChallenge, 12 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 123-30 (1997) (defending VAWA
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the Court's analysis of congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause and focus instead on its analysis of congressional authority to enact
60
§ 13981 of VAWA under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." 6 1 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress "the
under Commerce Clause rationale). See generally SenatorJoseph R. Biden,Jr., The
Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Defense, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
1 (2000) (defending civil rights remedy of VAWA as valid exercise of Congress'
Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause authority).
Jordan J.
Other scholars have defended VAWA on other grounds. See, e.g.,
Paust, Human Rights Purposesof the Violence Against Women Act andInternationalLaw's
Enhancement of CongressionalPower, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 209, 209-21 (2000) (utilizing principles of international law to support VAWA); Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn,
Comment, A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1097, 1144-45 (1998) (analogizing plight of women to slavery and defending VAWA under Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery); Sarah B.
Lawsky, Note, A Nineteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 109
YALE L.J. 783, 796-815 (2000) (arguing that VAWA is constitutional under Nineteenth Amendment's implied rights of full citizenship). But see Lisa A. Carroll,
Comment, Women's Powerless Tool: How Congress Overreached the Constitution With the
Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 30J. MARSFHALL L. REV.803, 82034 (1997) (arguing that VAWA is unconstitutional); Troy Robert Rackham, Note,
Enumerated Limits, Normative Principles, and CongressionalOverstepping: Why the Civil
Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act Is Unconstitutional,6 WM. & MARYJ.
WOMEN & L. 447, 460-84 (2000) (same).
60. There is a significant argument to be made that civil rights legislation
should come under the rubric of the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Commerce Clause. As Professor Jack Balkin has argued, "The Fourteenth Amendment
is the natural home of civil rights legislation. It guarantees equal citizenship, and
it gives Congress power to enforce equality rights." Jack M. Balkin, The Court Defers
to a Racist Era, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2000, at A23.
Justice Douglas had stated that the Fourteenth Amendment was a preferable
source of congressional authority for the major civil rights legislation of the 1960s.
See Heart of Atlanta Hotel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1964) (Douglas,J., concurring) (stating that "the right of people to be free of state action that
discriminates against them because of race. . . 'occupies a more protected position
in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal
across state lines"'). Douglas argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was "much
more obvious as a protective measure under the Fourteenth Amendment than
under the Commerce Clause" because the "former deals with the constitutional
status of the individual not with the impact on commerce of local activities or vice
versa." Id. Justice Douglas stated emphatically: "our decision should be based on
the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby putting an end to all obstructionist strategies
and allowing every person-whatever his race, creed, or color-to patronize all
places of public accommodation without discrimination whether he travels interstate or intrastate." Id. at 286. Justice Goldberg agreed, noting that the purpose of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was "the vindication of human dignity and not mere
economics." Id. at 291 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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power to enforce, by appropriate legislation" the rights enumerated in section 1.62 In Morrison, the Court did not discuss at length the section 1
violation posed by the case. 6 3 It appears the Court agreed that the State's
response to violence against women constituted a violation of section 1.64
The Court noted that a "voluminous congressional record" supported the
conclusion that "there is pervasive bias in various state justice systems
against victims of gender-motivated violence." 65 The Court then briefly
described the congressional findings:
Congress received evidence that many participants in state justice
systems are perpetuating an array of erroneous stereotypes and
assumptions. Congress concluded that these discriminatory stereotypes often result in insufficient investigation and prosecution
of gender-motivated crime, inappropriate focus on the behavior
and credibility of the victims of that crime, and unacceptably le-

Id.
62. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
gives Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of"
Article I. Id.
63. See Catharine MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v.
Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REv. 135, 152 (2000) (criticizing invalidation of VAWA as
Supreme Court's most damaging ruling on state action). Based on an extensive
congressional record documenting both absent and inadequately applied state law
against gender-motivated violence, VAWA empowered victims of sex-based crimes
by making private acts of sex discrimination civilly actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment's section 5 enforcement authority. See id. at 138 (describing
VAWA's remedial scheme as based in equality principles of Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause). In criticizing the majority's Fourteenth Amendment
holding, MacKinnon noted that the Court did not challenge the congressional
finding that violence against women is a major social problem inadequately addressed by state authorities, nor did the Court dispute that gender-motivated violence constituted discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 164
(stating Supreme Court's silence was notable given recent section 5 case law).
64. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-20 (2000) (discussing
Brzonkala's argument that "there is pervasive bias in various state justice systems
against victims of gender-motivated violence"); see also VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
LAw AND LITIGATION § 6:24 (David Frazee et al. eds., 1998) (discussing approach of
state justice systems toward victims of gender-motivated crimes). The Court stated
that state-sponsored gender discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause
unless the discriminatory conduct passes intermediate scrutiny. See Morrison, 529
U.S. at 620 (stating that gender classification must serve "'important governmental
objectives and ... the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives"'). After reciting the standard for intermediate scrutiny, the Court failed to apply it to § 13981, instead relying on the state
action requirement. See id. (discussing need to limit reach of Fourteenth
Amendment).
65. Id. at 619-20; see also VIOLENCE AGAINSr WOMEN, supra note 64, at § 1:49
(explaining that "[w] hen women finally turn to the justice system for protection,
they are often treated with derision").
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nient punishments for those who are actually convicted of gender-motivated violence. 66
The Court then moved from the section 1 violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the issue of congressional authority to remedy the unequal
protection under section 5. Before turning to the details of the Court's
section 5 analysis, however, it is important to step back and examine the
section 1 violation because its scope has implications for congressional
power to fashion appropriate remedial legislation under section 5.
11.

UNEQUAL PROTECTION

Violence against women that is motivated by gender animus includes
instances of stalking, battery, assault, rape and homicide. In analyzing
how states afford women unequal protection against this kind of violence,
I will focus on the social and legal practices surrounding rape because the
Morrison case is about rape. Despite my focus, much of what I argue regarding states' unequal protection against rape can also be said of other
crimes that are similarly motivated by gender animus. Similar analyses
could be made of wife abuse and murder, for example, if one examined
the marital tort immunity doctrine 67 and the gendered notions of provo69
cation 68 and self-defense in the law of homicide.
Christy Brzonkala's experience of rape was typical in many ways. That
she was raped itself is not unusual. T1 The Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention's most recent National Violence Against Women Survey of
8000 women indicates that eighteen percent of women have experienced
an attempted or completed rape. 7 1 The same survey indicates that twenty66. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-20 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385-86
(1994); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38, 41-55 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 33-35, 41,
43-47 (1991)).
67. See generally Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (examining chastisement and implications
of modern civil fights reform on its demise).
68. See Victoria Nourse, Passion'sProgress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1389-1407 (1997) (discussing reform in "crimes of
passion" laws).
69. See generally FEMICIDE: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN KILLING (Jill Radford &
Diana E.H. Russell eds., 1992) (discussing woman killing).
70. See MacKinnon, supra note 63, at 143 (describing societal and legal reality
informing Congress' decision to enact VAWA). Evidence substantiating the failure
of state justice systems to provide women with equal protection from domestic violence and sexual assault was significant:
One in four women in America reports having been raped, with fortyfour percent reporting having been subjected to completed or attempted
rape at least once in their lives. Almost one in ten women between the
ages of fifteen and forty-four who has had sexual intercourse reports that
her first act of sexual intercourse was "not voluntary."
Id. at 141-42.
71. See Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Prevalence, Incidence, and Consequences of Violence Against Women: Findingsfrom the National Violence Against Women
Survey, REs. IN BRIEF (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Inst. ofJustice, Ctrs. for Disease
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five percent of women have been either raped or physically assaulted by a
spouse, cohabiting partner or date. 72 The study concludes, "given the pervasiveness of rape and physical assault among American women, it is imperative that violence against women be treated as a major criminal justice
7
and public health concern." 3
Brzonkala was raped by acquaintances. Like Morrison and Crawford,
the vast majority of rapists are not complete strangers to their victims.
Friends and acquaintances commit fifty-three percent of all rapes and sexual assaults. 7" Intimates-that is, husbands, boyfriends, former husbands
Control & Prevention), Nov. 1998, at 2; see also S. REP. No. 101-545, at 43 (1990)
(citing testimony by Dr. Mary Koss before the Senate Judiciary Committee) ("[One
hundred twenty-five thousand] college women can expect to be raped during
this-or any-year."). But see Richard J. Gelles, Estimating the Incidence and Prevalence of Violence Against Women: National Data Systems and Sources, 6 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 784 (2000) (criticizing present self-reporting surveys that provide
local and national data on cases of violence against women); but see also Andrew
Percy & Pat Mayhew, Estimating Sexual Victimization in a National Crime Survey: A
New Approach, 6 STUD. ON CRIME & CRIME PREVENTION 125, 137-40, 145-47 (1997)
(analyzing reasons for underreporting and suggesting new methodology to better
measure national sexual victimization figures). Researchers have two principal
problems in measuring sexual victimization: first, agreeing what it comprises and,
second, obtaining reliable measures. Crime surveys are inadequate measures because many victims simply do not report their experiences to police. The wish to
avoid trauma of official action notwithstanding, the most common reason for not
reporting is that the victims believe their experience did not meet the legal criteria
of "crime." Victims often label offensive behavior in crime surveys as "wrong, but
not criminal." In many cases, the offensive behavior does rise to the level of criminal, yet the women do not portray their victimization as a punishable crime. This
is particularly true when the offender is an acquaintance instead of a stranger.
Therefore, the non-equivalence of legal and social definitions also undermines the
extent to which women report sexual victimization. Women need to see themselves as victims of rape in order to report the crime. Although the circumstances
may legally qualify as rape, social understanding of rape often differs especially in
the context of acquaintance rape. See generally Nathan W. Pino & Robert F. Meier,
Gender Differences in Rape Reporting, 40 SEx ROLES 980 (1999) (analyzing reporting
differences based on relationship between rapist and victim and on victim gender). See also R. Barry Ruback, Comment on Bachman (1993): The Victim-Offender Relationship Does Affect Victims'Decisions to Report Sexual Assaults, 20 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
271 (1993) (stating victim-offender relationship is important because it helps both
victim and others define whether or not action is rape and whether or not reporting crime to police is worthwhile); Percy & Mayhew, supra at 125 (stating that police routinely undercount sexual offenses).
72. See Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 71, at 2 (stating statistics of assaults by
spouses or dates). Additionally, eight percent of women said they had been
stalked at some point in their lives. See id. (noting survey results on stalking).
73. Id. at 11.
74. See Ronet Bachman & Linda Saltzman, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special
Report: Violence Against Women: Estimates from the Redesigned Survey (U.S. Dep't ofJustice), Aug. 1995, at 3, 6 (stating that "[f] fiends and acquaintances commit approximately half of all rapes and sexual assaults"). Acquaintances are defined as friends
or former friends, roommates or boarders, schoolmates, neighbors, coworkers or
some other known non-relative. See id. at 6. Sexual assaults are defined as unwanted sexual contact that may or may not involve force, including grabbing or
fondling. See id. at 7.
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and former boyfriends-commit an additional twenty-six percent of all
rapes and sexual assaults. 75 In total, acquaintances and intimates commit
76
four out of five rapes and sexual assaults.
Morrison and Crawford did not break Brzonkala's bones, beat her up
or threaten her with a gun or knife. They did not have to. Pinning her
with their arms and legs was sufficient to force her to have sex against her
will. Like Brzonkala, the vast majority of rape victims suffer little or no
physical injury extrinsic to the rape itself. Only about ten percent of rape
victims suffer extrinsic physical injury. 7 7 The major injury most rape victims suffer is psychological.
After being raped, Brzonkala dropped out of school, suffered from
depression and attempted suicide. Like Brzonkala, the vast majority of
78
rape victims suffer serious psychological harm from the experience.
Contrary to popular opinion, acquaintance rape victims suffer more psychological damage than do stranger rape victims because self-blame is
higher when a woman is raped by an acquaintance. 79 As one study put it,
"[w]omen raped by men they knew attribute more blame for the rape to
themselves, see themselves in a less positive light, and tend to have higher
levels of psychological distress." 80 Self-blame is correlated with fear, anxi75. See id. at 3, 6 (giving statistics for rapes and sexual assaults by intimates).
Acquaintances and relatives commit thirty-two percent of all homicides committed
on women. See id. at 4. Intimates commit an additional twenty-eight percent of
them. See id.
76. See id. at 1, 6 (noting overwhelming percentage of sexual assaults and
rapes committed on women by acquaintances and intimates).
77. See Susan B. Sorenson & Judith M. Siegel, Gender, Ethnicity, and Sexual Assault: Findingsfrom a Los Angeles Study, 48J. Soc. ISSUES 93, 97 (1992) (stating low
percentage of women physically injured in addition to assault). Therefore, ninety
percent usually have little corroborative evidence of the assault in the form of physical harm to their bodies. See id.
78. See C. Lee Wise (pseudonym), Reflections of a Rape Survivor, 27 WOMEN'S
STUD. Q. 162, 163 (1999) (observing uncomfortable social and personal perceptions surrounding sexual crimes that create sense of shame and complicity in victims). Sexual crimes are uniquely traumatic to victims because they instill feelings
of collusion, shame and guilt.
79. See Bonnie L. Katz & Martha R. Burt, Self Blame in Recovery from Rape, in
RAPE & SEXUAL ASSAULT 11162 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1988) (describing differences in reported self-blame from women raped by strangers and non-strangers).
80. Bonnie L. Katz, The Psychological Impact of Stranger Versus NonstrangerRape
on Victims' Recovery, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 267 (Andrea Parrot
& Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991). The study also said, "Women raped by strangers
also appear to feel recovered sooner than women raped by nonstrangers." Id. Selfblame decreases the speed with which a woman recovers from rape. See Katz &
Burt, supra note 79, at 151 (noting decrease in recovery); see also Julia Schwendinger & Herman Schwendinger, Rape Victims and the False Sense of Guilt, 15 CRIME &
Soc. JUST. 4, 4-5 (1980) (examining difficulty in recovery for women with selfblame about rape); David Valentiner et al., Coping Strategies and PosttraumaticStress
Disorderin Female Victims of Sexual and Nonsexual Assault, 105 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL.
455, 458 (1996) (explaining that coping through self-blame impedes recovery).
Self-blame has severe psychological and somatic consequences. Self-blame decreases the chance that a woman victimized by rape or attempted rape will tell
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ety and depression, 8 1 as well as posttraumatic stress disorder. 82 This negative symptomalogy can have dire consequences: "The more women
blamed themselves for the rape, the more suicidal they had been since the
rape, the greater the likelihood that they had been psychiatrically hospitalized, and the lower their self-esteem." 83 In total, nearly one-third of rape
victims develop posttraumatic stress disorder, and thirteen percent of rape
victims attempt suicide.8 4 Brzonkala's depression and attempted suicide,
then, were not unique.
The institutional response to Brzonkala's complaint also was not
unique. Brzonkala received no legal or quasi-legal vindication against her
rapists. She lodged a complaint under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. Two university hearings ended with no conviction for Crawford and a
conviction of "using abusive language" for Morrison. The punishment imposed on Morrison was a one-hour educational session. 85 Like Brzonkala,
someone about the attack, report the rape to the police or obtain necessary psychological support. See ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE 56 (Libbu Kessman ed., 1988) (describing lack of self-help by women with greater amounts of
self-blame). When women do not obtain psychological support, they do not hear
professional counselors tell them they are not to blame. See Katz & Burt, supra
note 79, at 165 (reporting that guilt hampers quick recovery and that sixty-five
percent of women said that most helpful thing rape crisis counselor said was "you
are not to blame").
81. See Katz & Burt, supra note 79, at 166 (stating that "higher levels of initial
self-blame were significantly associated with the presence of more negative
symptomalogy such as fear, anxiety, and depression").
82. See Valentiner et al., supra note 80, at 457-58 (describing correlation of
self-blame with symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder).
83. See Katz & Burt, supra note 79, at 151, 162-63 ("The more women felt that
they had blamed themselves for the rape, the higher their current levels of psychoHigher levels of selflogical distress as measured by negative symptomalogy ....
blame were also associated with more hours of counseling since the rape... and
with the length of time women felt it took (or would take) for them to be 'recovered."') (statistics omitted).
84. See NAT'L VICTIM CTR., RAPE-RELATED POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 2
(1992) (discussing incidence of posttraumatic stress disorder in rape victims).
Rape victims are 4.1 times more likely than non-crime victims to contemplate suicide. See id.
85. See Miller, supra note 49, at CI (relating further misadventures of Morrison and Crawford); see also Lisa K. Garcia, Players Chargedwith Rape 2 Members of Va.
Tech's Football Team Are Arrested, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Dec. 17, 1996, at
Al (noting charge). State police and university officials cleared Morrison and
Crawford of criminal liability. Michael Hemphill, Court Hears Brzonkala, Supreme
Court Considers Constitutionality of Violence Against Women Act, ROANOKE TIMES &
WORLD NEWS, Jan. 12, 2000, at Al. Subsequently, however, Morrison was charged
with public intoxication, petty larceny, destruction of property and possession of a
fake license. See Miller, supra note 49, at Cl (discussing charges that resulted in
Morrison being kicked off Hokies' Sugar Bowl Travel Roster). Crawford was
charged with defrauding an innkeeper and felony hit and run with injury. See
Randy King, Georgia Stories, Rumors Still Dog Hokies' Beamer, ROANOKE TIMES &
WORLD NEWS, Dec. 12, 1995, at BI (describing charges against Crawford). A
month after being indicted in connection with unrelated assault and abduction
allegations, Crawford faced another charge of rape and attempted sodomy after a
woman told police she was gang raped by Crawford and another man. See Lisa K.
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the vast majority of rape victims never get to witness their rapists convicted
of any serious crime or sentenced to serious punishment., 6
States historically have denied women equal protection of the law in
response to rape, and continue to do so. Traditional common law rules
for rape complaints evinced obvious gender bias. Over the past few decades, these rules have changed, but the biased imperatives behind them
continue to direct the discretionary decisions of state actors. First, police
disproportionately code rapes as "unfounded" or place them in non-criminal codes where they receive little to no investigation.8 7 Also, police disproportionately discourage women who have been raped from proceeding
with their complaints. 88 Furthermore, prosecutors disproportionately dismiss rape complaints.8 9 A state action analysis of violence against women
must comprehend not just the formal law but the discretionary decisions
of state actors. Through these decisions, state actors deny women who are
raped the equal protection of the criminal law.
A.

Formal Rape Law Has Historically Been Unequal

Historically, rape law raised unique procedural hurdles for rape victims that victims of other crimes did not have to surmount. Derived from
English common law and applicable in most jurisdictions until the mid to
late 1970s, these formal rules embodied clear presumptions against women who complained of having been raped.9 ° These rules included absolute exemptions from criminal liability for men who raped their wives. 9 1
They included requirements that the victim establish that she resisted her
attacker to the utmost, freshly complained of having been raped and corroborated her testimony with other evidence. 9 2 They included biased suppositions about victims who had previously engaged in sexual intercourse
outside of marriage. 93 Finally, they included special cautionary instrucGarcia, 2 Hokies Face Sex Charges, GrandJury Indicts Former Tech Football Players on
Rape, Attempted Sodomy Counts, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Apr. 24,1997, at C1

(reporting rape and attempted sodomy charges against Crawford).
86. See generally Michelle Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U.
ILL. L. REv. 953.

87. For a discussion of "unfounding", see infra notes 116-36 and accompanying text.
88. For a discussion of police discouragement, see infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
89. For a discussion of disproportionate prosecutorial dismissal of rape
claims, see infra notes 146-61 and accompanying text.
90. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 28 (1987) (noting courts have created "set
of clear presumptions against the woman who complains of simple rape").
91. For a discussion of the marital rape exemption, see infra notes 95-97 and
accompanying text.
92. For a discussion of the requirement that a woman resist her attacker to
the utmost, that she promptly complain and that she provide corroborating evidence, see infra notes 98-104, 108-11 and accompanying text.
93. For a discussion of these biased suppositions, see infra notes 105-07 and
accompanying text.
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tions read to the jury to warn them of the fallibility of the testimony of
those who allege they have been raped.9 4
When scholars examine the biased presumptions against women embodied in the English common law of rape, many focus on the marital
rape exemption. The marital rape exemption denied married women the
protection of criminal rape law, simply by virtue of the fact that they were
married. 95 It provided that a man could not be guilty of rape for anything
he did to his wife because, as the Model Penal Code still puts it by definition, rape involves "a male who has sexual intercourse with a female, not
his wife." 9 6 Since the 1970s, most states have eroded or abolished entirely
97
the common law marital rape exemption.
The marital rape exemption is the most obvious gender bias in the
common law of rape. Other requirements that historically had to be met
before a rape conviction could be obtained were also biased. For example, the historical requirement that a rape victim resist her attacker to the
utmost to prove non-consent was unique in the criminal law.9 8 Many
other crimes have had a consent defense, but none has defined consent in
such a way that "no" would not suffice to disprove it. 99 The resistance
requirement mandated that a woman physically resist her attacker to the
utmost to prove both that she did not consent and that he had to use force
to subdue her.100 The resistance requirement has evolved over the course
of the last few decades from an utmost resistance requirement to a reasonable resistance requirement in many jurisdictions to the more common
situation today, where no formal resistance requirement remains in many
rape statutes.' 0
Historically, in a significant minority ofjurisdictions, corroboration of
the victim's complaint with other evidence also was a requirement before a

94. For a discussion of these cautionary instructions, see infra notes 112-13
and accompanying text.
95. See Robin West, Equality Theory, MaritalRape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 63-71 (1990) (examining theory and constitutionality of marital rape exception).
96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1) (1980).
97. See Lalenya Weintraub Siegel, Note, The MaritalRape Exemption: Evolution
To Extinction, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 364-69 (1995) (describing states, such as
New York and Oregon, that have completely abolished marital rape exception and
other states that have moved towards abolition); see also Rebecca Ryan, The Sex
Right: A Legal History of the MaritalRape Exemption, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 941 (1995)
(discussing modern trend toward abolition of exception).
98. See ESTRiCH, supra note 90, at 29 (explaining that crime of rape is unique
because definition of non-consent includes element of physical resistance).

99. See id. at 40 ("The requirement that the victim of simple rape do more
than say no was virtually without precedent in the criminal law.").
100. See Anderson, supra note 86, at 953 (describing resistance requirement).
101. See id. at 957 (discussing evolution of resistance requirement).
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rape conviction could be obtained. 1° 2 The extent of corroboration depended on the plausibility of the complaint itself. 1o3 Cases involving stranger rapes did not have to be corroborated as much as cases involving
acquaintance rapes.

10 4

Additionally, the law historically insisted that rape victims be sexually
virtuous in order to receive vindication for the sexual transgressions
against them. In Biblical times, the crime of rape was limited to the rape
of virgins. 105 The rape of a virgin was not conceptualized as a transgression against a female's sexual autonomy; rather, it was the theft of her

chastity, which was a property transgression against her father or future
husband. Although a formal virginity requirement waned as English law

recognized that women and girls who were not virgins could also be raped,
the victim's sexual chastity remained predominant in courts' evaluation of
the crime.', 6 The rape of a non-virgin, for example, was not as serious a
crime as was the rape of a virgin and was not punished as severely. Even

when statutes in both England and the United States made no formal distinctions between virgins and non-virgins, the centrality of the victim's
chastity endured. A victim's lack of sexual chastity was considered relevant
evidence on the issue of both consent and the victim's credibility as a witness, that is, her propensity to tell the truth. 1 7 A lack of chastity on the
part of the victim suggested both that she had a propensity to consent to
sexual intercourse and that she had a propensity to lie.
Historically, the common law of rape also required a prompt complaint before a rape case could be prosecuted. This special rule evolved
from the doctrine of "hue and cry," which was a legal expectation that
102. See ESTRICH, supra note 90, at 43 (noting that corroboration of rape victim's testimony to support conviction continues to be critical factor in disposition
of rape cases today).
103. See id. at 44 (explaining that "[t]he plausibility of the victim's story was
determinative").
104. See id. at 42-45 (describing corroboration differences).
105. See Deuteronomy 22:23-27 (reciting distinction). The text of Deuteronomy
makes a distinction between the rape of a betrothed virgin and the rape of an unbetrothed virgin. If a man found a betrothed virgin and "the man force her and
lie with her" and she cried out against the violation, he was to be punished by
being stoned to death. See id. However, "ifa man finds a damsel that is a virgin,
which is not betrothed, and lay hold on her and lie with her," he had to marry her
"because he hath humbled her" and he had to pay her father fifty shekels of silver,
which was the bride price. Deuteronomy 22:28-29. The bride price compensated the
father for the loss of his daughter's virginity. The only "punishment" for the rape
of an un-betrothed virgin (besides paying the usual bride price) was that the man
"may not put her away all his days," meaning that he could never divorce her.
Deuteronomy 22:29. The punishment of seduction of a "maid that is not betrothed"
is also marriage and paying money to the father. Exodus 22:16-17.
106. See ESTRICH, supra note 90, at 50-51 (discussing prevalence of chastity
requirement).
107. See id. at 47 (noting relevance of victim's chastity).
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victims of rape would cry out immediately after being violated.' 08 The
prompt complaint requirement occasionally barred complaints made even
one day after the event.1 09 In this country, the prompt complaint rule
emerged in some jurisdictions as a short statute of limitations on the filing
of rape complaints.' 10 In other jurisdictions, it emerged as a presumption
that, without a prompt complaint, a report of rape was false. 1 '
Since the nineteenth century, special cautionary instructions to juries
in rape cases provide the final example of the common law's distrust of
women who complained of being raped. 1 2 These instructions directed
the jury to evaluate the testimony of a woman who complained of being
raped with extra caution. In their usual prescription, the jury was directed
to "evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with special
care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty
of determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried
out in private." ' 1 3 These instructions implied that women are untrustworthy as witnesses and that the jury should not convict a defendant on the
basis of their testimony alone.
Most of these biased requirements in rape law-the marital rape exemption, the requirements of resistance, sexual virtue, corroboration,
prompt complaint and cautionary instructions regarding a rape complainant's testimony-have been modified or abolished in the law. It may be
easy, therefore, to dismiss them as historical wrongs. Such a dismissal
would be unwise. Today, the biased traditional requirements are operational in law through more informal channels. They direct the discretionary decisions of police and prosecutors.
B.

Police Discretion Over Rape Complaints Is Exercised Unequally

The criminal justice system is built upon the discretionary decisions of
14
As cases progress
state actors who process criminal complaints.
demands for
courts,
to
the
prosecutors
through the system from police to
108. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Paradoxof the Fresh Complaint Rule, 37 B.C. L.
REv. 441, 446-48 (1996) (describing "hue and cry" rationale); see also Michael H.
Graham, The Cay of Rape: The Prompt Complaint Doctrine and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 19 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 489, 491-500 (1983) (reviewing theories that undergird common law prompt complaint rule).
109. See Stanchi, supra note 108, at 451-52 (discussing traditional "strict imme-

diacy requirement" that applied to prompt complaint rule).
110. See id. at 452-53 (explaining versions of prompt complaint rule in U.S.).
111. See id. at 446 (noting application of rule in some jurisdictions as
presumption).

112. See ESTRICH, supra note 90, at 54 (illustrating problems caused by cautionary instruction).

113. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES
§ 213.6(5), at 412).
114. See Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951)
(Douglas, J., concurring). "It is not without significance, that most provisions of

the Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference
between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict
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economy dictate that officials process only select cases. Consequently, a
broad area of discretion enables officials to decide which suspects to prosecute and on what charges. Normative values and personal bias inform
police and prosecutorial judgments regarding relevant evidence, appropriate procedure and, ultimately, the merits of the complaint. Thus, access
to justice for rape victims is often governed not so much by statute but by
police and prosecutorial discretion.
The selection process begins when police decide whether a report is
valid, whether a reported offense is a crime, whether to investigate the
reported crime and whether to arrest a suspect.' 15 Within the context of
those discretionary decisions, women have been and continue to be denied equal protection of the law when subjected to criminal violence motivated by gender. The denial of equal protection occurs because police
exercise their discretion when dealing with rape complaints in an unfair
and unequal manner. This unequal treatment is evidenced by two institutionalized police practices that undermine the process by which rape victims seek protection and justice. First, police disproportionately categorize
rape complaints as "unfounded" or log them under non-criminal codes.
Second, police disproportionately discourage rape victims from proceeding with their complaints.
1.

Unequal Categorizationof Rape Complaints

Police deny equal protection to rape victims by disproportionately
mis-categorizing legitimate rape complaints in two ways. First, police can
decide that the victim is fabricating the complaint and deem the complaint "unfounded." 116 Second, police can decide that what happened to
the complainant did not constitute a crime and assign the complaint a
non-criminal code. 17 In both instances, police terminate their official obligation to investigate rape allegations further and often deny legitimate
victims full redress through the criminal law.' 18 At this early stage of investigation, police disproportionately categorize rape allegations in a manner that denies the occurrence of any criminal wrongdoing.1 19 For
procedural safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice under
the law." Id.
115. See ARTHUR RosETr & DONALD R. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT 4 (1976)
(noting discretionary and selective nature of American criminal justice system). In
practice, most official decisions are not governed by a strict rule of law.
116. See Mark Fazlollah, Philadelphias Hidden Rapes, at http://
www.jrsainfo.org/events/conference/2000-conference/presentations/
markfazlollah.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2000) (offering statistics on cases police
consider "unfounded").
117. See id. (discussing categorization of victims' reports by police).
118. See Wayne A. Kerstetter, Gateway to Justice: Police and ProsecutorialResponse
to Sexual Assaults Against Women, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 267, 268 (1990)
(discussing effects of police decision-making with respect to rape victims).
119. See Fazlollah, Philadelphia'sHidden Rapes, supra note 116 (noting police's
faulty categorization of rape allegations). An "unfounded" case means that the
police believe the complainant lied; non-criminal codes, such as "information only
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example, Philadelphia police have acknowledged that the department's
rape squad wrongly shelved approximately 400 cases a year using a noncriminal code as a dumping ground for those cases that the police found
difficult.120 These cases were not isolated events; the practice of miscod12 1
ing rapes is endemic.
The labels differ among police departments across the country, but
the process is similar. By unfounding and downgrading crimes involving
violence against women, police departments neglect to investigate hundreds, perhaps thousands, of legitimate rape complaints every year.' 22 As
a result, rape complaints fall into statistical blackholes, cities underreport
their rape rates and police departments deny women equal protection and
justice. For example, in the past decade, the Philadelphia Police Department decided that a fairly large percentage of reported sexual assaults
were unworthy of further investigation.' 23 During that time, the rate for
"unfounded" rape complaints reached eighteen percent, and the rate for
report" and code "2701," generally suggest that the alleged events, whether true or
not, did not constitute criminal conduct. See id. (defining "unfounded").
120. See Craig R. McCoy & Mark Fazlollah, DNA Backs a Rape Story Police Ignored, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 3, 2000, at B1 (illustrating typical procedure that leads
to "unfounding" of legitimate rape allegations). Immediately after being abducted
and raped, a seven year-old Philadelphia girl was found wandering alone in a
North Philadelphia neighborhood. See Mark Fazlollah, Police May Ignore Rape Complaints to Boost Image (June 15, 2000), availableat http://www.womensnews.org (discussing events surrounding girl's rape). A responding patrol officer questioned
the girl, wrote up the report as a case of a "lost child" and made no mention of the
child's rape allegations. See id. (same). Subsequent pressure from the girl's family
lead the department's sex-crime unit to proceed with a cursory investigation. Melody Madison was beaten and raped in a deserted Philadelphia playground. See id.
(same). The city's sex-crime unit said it could not contact Madison after a detective initially interviewed her in August 1995 at the hospital were she was treated for
a blow that knocked four of her teeth out. See id. (same). Without a second interview, police insisted they could not verify if a crime took place and therefore classified the allegation as code "2701." See id. (same).
121. See Fazlollah, Philadelphia's Hidden Rapes, supra note 116 (highlighting
propensity to unfound and underreport rape rates in other metropolitan areas).
"The practices we found in Philadelphia appear in cities large and small." Id. The
Phoenix rape squad shelves difficult rape cases with a code called "information
only report." See id. (noting rape case procedure of Phoenix rape squad). According to a former Phoenix sex crimes supervisor, approximately one third of the
city's sexual assault complaints were classified as "information only." See id.
(same). Milwaukee has repeatedly reported more than forty percent of rape complaints were "unfounded." See id. (discussing Milwaukee rape squad procedure).
122. See id. (noting effects of police's unfounding and downgrading of
crimes). After PhiladelphiaInquirerreporter Mark Fazlollah put a spotlight on the
habitual unfounding of rape allegations by the Philadelphia rape squad, the city
police department reopened the 2,000 cases buried by code "2701" during the past
five years. See id. (noting reaction of police department after press initiated scrutiny). To date, police have already made forty-six arrests from cases dating to 1995.
See id.
123. See id. (discussing decisions of Philadelphia police with respect to sexual
assaults).
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assigning non-criminal codes to sexual assault complaints reached thirty
percent. 124
Other cities have experienced similar problems. In 1989, for instance, the Oakland Police Department coded twenty-five percent of reported rapes as "unfounded." 12 5 More common than even this high
"unfounded" rate, cases would be left in pending files on police officers'
desks without proper investigation. 12 6 Mark Melton, a deputy district attorney in Oakland, explained that so many complaints were ignored because "[police] tend to see a black woman smoking crack as a woman who
is willing to give herself up for dope. They consider that tantamount to
consent if you are smoking [crack]. Credibility is everything."1 2 7 After a
three-month investigation by the San FranciscoExaminer, the Oakland Police Department was forced to re-open and investigate more than 200 sex128
ual assaults it had miscoded as "unfounded."
Even more recently, Milwaukee has reported that more than forty
percent of rape complaints made to its police department were "unfounded."' 29 Virginia Beach currently reports that about fifty percent of
all rape complaints made to its police department are unfounded., 30 A
Chicago Police Department audit of 2386 random "unfounded" complaints concluded that "[t] here exists among detectives an insensitivity to
the victim's plight." 13' When the victim violated sex role norms, police
were much more likely to unfound the complaint and choose not to arrest.' 32 Additionally, the audit found that a victim's failure to complain
promptly and a lack of corroborative evidence greatly impacted the police
1 33
department's decision to unfound the case and to arrest a suspect.
124. See id. (offering statistics for unfounded "rape" cases).
125. See Michael J. Ybarra, In Search of Justice: Oakland Woman Says She was
Raped and Pushes the System to Follow Up, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, at El (noting
treatment of reported rapes by Oakland police).
126. See Jane Gross, To Some Rape Victims, Justice Is Beyond Reach, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 1990, at A14 (discussing neglect of pending files by Oakland police).
127. Ybarra, supra note 125, at El.
128. See Oakland Police Say They Ignored Sex Assault Cases, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4,
1991, at 4 (stating that Oakland police responded to press inquiry by re-examining
cases).
129. See Fazlollah, Philadelphia'sHidden Rapes, supra note 116 (offering statistics on handling of rape cases by Milwaukee police).
130. See id. at 2 (discussing handling of rape case in Virginia Beach). By the
same token, departments that report extraordinarily low rates of "unfounding"
may be fiddling with numbers. Houston reports only one half of one percent of all
rapes reported are "unfounded." See Gross, supra note 126 (noting low percentage
of "unfounded" rapes in Houston police department). Houston police are not
required to write a formal police report if they do not think a rape complaint
constitutes a real crime. See id. (discussing requirements).
131. Kerstetter, supra note 118, at 281.
132. See id. (discussing likelihood of police's unfounding of complaints).
133. See id. (noting factors that influence police's decision to unfound cases).
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Why unfound or ignore so many rape complaints? There are stories
of police incompetence, bias and insensitivity to the plight of victims.', 4
More importantly, perhaps, police continue to weigh factors in their discretionary decisions that the law no longer formally requires: the degree
of resistance, whether a woman violated sex role norms, the promptness of
her complaint and the relationship between the victim and the offender.1 35 Regardless of cause, the effect is deleterious: many women who
136
report rape do not receive equal protection.

2.

Unequal Pressure on Victims to Withdraw Rape Complaints

Police also deny women equal protection of the law by disproportionately pressuring those who report being raped to withdraw their complaints. One major study indicates that a victim's decision to report having
been raped to the police is influenced by social expectations about
whether or not to report. 137 Social expectations, including those of the
police, also influence a victim's decision to withdraw her complaint.1 38
The victim's decision to withdraw a complaint after it is lodged with the
police "is more complex than simply a statement of victim volition."' 13 9
The police detective's "perceptions of the likely success of prosecution" of
a victim's claim bear on the victim's decision to proceed. 140 The disproportionate impact police officers have on a victim once she complains of

having been raped is an ordinarily unexamined aspect of powerful police
influence. 141
134. See DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VicriM's PERSPECTIVE 181, 202, 224 (1984).
135. See Kerstetter, supra note 118, at 310-11 (offering factors police use to
make determinations of whether to unfound cases).
136. See RUSSELL, supra note 134, at 241.137. See GREENBERG & RUBACK, supra note 12, at 176 (examining role of social
influence on victims decision to report victimization to police). Rape victims' predominant emotional reaction to their victimization is fear demonstrated by their
immediate need to obtain protection and emotional support. Consequently, social
influence is an important determinant in a rape victim's decision to report their
victimization to police. See id. at 177 (reporting high percentages of victims consult with others before reporting). Moreover, the study suggests that, after reporting, continued supportive behavior is critical to the victim's decision to ultimately
pursue the case through the criminal justice system. See id. at 176.
138. See id. (stating that positive reaction to victim and absence of pressure to
drop case are closely correlated with likelihood of case proceeding through
system).
139. Kerstetter, supra note 118, at 307.
140. See id. at 301 (stating that victims often experience apprehension when
deciding whether to prosecute).
141. See id. at 309 (noting that police use complainant's apprehension as leverage against complainant). The study concluded that a scientific analysis of "complainant willingness to prosecute may, in fact, be disclosing the circumstances
under which detectives tend to be inclined or disinclined to pursue a complaint."
Id.
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Another study that analyzed police influence revealed that a victim's
willingness to prosecute her claim after she has reported the rape to the
police "[represents] a major point of [police] discretion, partly because
the decision is superficially not an official decision."' 42 As the study explained, "the detective does not have to create the elements by which to
manipulate the victim's decision; all that is required is a selective presentation of the reality . . .that confronts her." 143 For example, police may

persuade a victim to withdraw the complaint by emphasizing the wellknown obstacles that she will face if she does proceed, including a grueling cross-examination by the defense attorney and the limited likelihood
of success at trial. The complicated set of reasons considered by a victim
when choosing whether to proceed "provides the detective the possibility
for manipulation." 144 The study concluded, "[tlhese interacting dimensions, namely low visibility, credible risks for the citizen, situational ambiguity, low credibility of potential complainant, and self-interest of an
official, provide a model for the appearance and dynamics of the abuse of
45
discretion in official decision-making."'
C.

ProsecutorialDiscretion Over Rape Complaints Is Exercised Unequally

Independent of the work of police, prosecutors also deny women
equal protection of the law by dismissing rape cases disproportionately. If
a rape victim reports having been raped to the police, and if police found
the complaint and make an arrest, then police turn the case over to the
district attorney's office for prosecution. At that point, prosecutors act as
"gatekeepers" in deciding which of these rape cases will be prosecuted. 146
Unfortunately, prosecutors keep a disproportionate number of rape victims waiting at the gate. The SenateJudiciary Committee found that prosecutors are twice as likely to dismiss a rape case as to dismiss a murder
case, and about forty percent more likely to dismiss a rape case than to
47
dismiss a robbery case.1
Of those rape cases police deliver to the district attorney's office for
prosecution that fail to result in a conviction, eighty-nine percent are the
result of prosecutorial dismissals. 148 One former chief of the sex crimes
unit in New York City, Alice Vachss, recounted, "[a]mong those rapists
142. Id. at 303.
143. Id. at 304.
144. Id.
145. Id.; see also VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 64, at § 1:49 (noting
empirical evidence ofjustice system's selectivity and insensitivity to complaints of

gender-motivated crime).
146. See generally Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting Victims' Allegations of Sexual Assault: ProsecutorialAccounts of Case Rqections, 38 Soc. PROBS. 213 (1991).
147. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993).
148. See Alice Vachss, Rape and Denial NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 22, 1993, at 14

(noting percentage of cases dismissed by prosecutors after failing to result in
convictions).
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actually arrested, few are vigorously prosecuted." 149 She contended, the
most "dangerous" aspect of the nearly unfettered prosecutorial discretion
to cherry-pick cases for trial is that this discretion,"is exercised in the dark,
often by minimally trained law graduates, with few systems in place to protect against bias or stupidity."' 5 0 Why then do prosecutors reject so many
cases? "Prejudice is one answer," Vachss said.' 5 1 "Many victims fail to
meet (undisclosed, unacknowledged and always denied) law enforcement
15 2
standards for behavior, background or ethnicity."
Research corroborates Vachss' contention. One seventeen-month
study in 1991 of two district attorneys' offices in different cities involved
the observation of more than 300 case screenings where district attorneys
decided whether cases were accepted or rejected for prosecution. The
study revealed that discretion was often exercised against women who were
153
homeless, prostituted, addicted or involved in other criminal activity.
The study also revealed that "prosecutors rely on assumptions about relationships, gender, and sexuality" in deciding whether to seek an indictment in rape cases, 154 and that the negative implications of this policy
were "particularly acute for acquaintance rape" victims.'

55

Prosecutors discredited victims' allegations of sexual assault to justify
rejecting cases. 15 6 Prosecutors compared the facts of cases to what they
believed would be the facts of "typical" rapes, and used such comparisons
to reject many complaints for prosecution. For example, one district attorney justified his rejection of an extended kidnapping in which the victim was raped vaginally because, "my experience has been that when a
rapist has a victim cornered for a long time, they engage in multiple acts
and different types of sexual acts."1 5 7 Another district attorney justified
his rejection of an assault that included three anal rapes because, "[i]t
seems to me he should be doing more than [anal rape] by the third
15 8

time,"

The traditional common law requirements of rape also came into play
more during this process of rejecting claims for prosecution. The study
recounted one district attorney who rejected a complaint because the victim failed to report promptly. The district attorney said, " [s] he didn't call
the police until four hours later. That isn't consistent with someone who
149. Id. Vachss continues, "I saw my share of rapists freed by bad laws. More
often, however, I saw rapists freed by prosecutors unwilling even to step into the
ring." Id.

150. Id.
151. Id.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
See Frohmann, supra note 146, at 222.
Id. at 224.
Id.
See id. at 215.
Id. at 217.

158. Id.
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has been raped." 159 District attorneys rejected other cases for lack of corroboration; one district attorney declared that she would never "file a oneon-one case," which is a case without corroborative evidence beyond the
testimony of the victim herself. 160 Therefore, this study found that prosecutors exercised their discretion to dismiss rape complaints for failure to
report promptly, lack of corroboration and victim deviation from the
norms of appropriate female behavior. The historical impediments written into rape law are thus related to today's disproportionate exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. Alice Vachss put it this way: " [d] espite the advent
of improved legislation, the underprosecution of sex crimes continues: no
longer tactically impossible, underprosecution has become a law enforcement choice."

16 1

A study of the Uniform Crime Reports and National Crime Victimization Surveys from 1973 to 1990 provides some statistical support for
Vachss' position. The study revealed that statutory rape law reforms have
"not had a very substantial effect" on "actual practices in the criminal justice system." 1 6 2 Despite rape law reforms, for example, there continued to
be a large "discount" for those who rape acquaintances. 163 The study
noted, "[a] lthough attitudes about rape and rape victimization may have
become more enlightened in the past two decades, there is little evidence
to suggest that these attitudes have been translated into significant performance changes in the criminal justice system." 164 Selective prosecution
of gender-motivated crimes also does not stop with police and prosecutor
selectivity. Judges also exercise discretion, and can trivialize women's complaints of abuse and impose de minimis sentences on men who abuse their
partners. 165 Despite the significant statutory reforms over the past few decades, not much has changed for many women who report having been
raped to the police.166 The biased common law requirements of rape continue to infect the process.
Police do not treat crimes against women equally to how they treat
other crimes. Rape is not taken as seriously and rape victims are dispro159. Id. at 219.
160. Id. at 220.
161. Id.
162. Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Ef
fects of Rape Law Reform: How FarHave We Really Come?, 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554, 573 (1993).

163. See id. at 574 (stressing continued "acquaintance discount" among rapists
of acquaintances).
164. Id.
165. See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 64, at § 1:49 (noting empirical
evidence ofjustice system's insensitivity to complaints of gender-motivated crime).
166. Studies in thirty states documented widespread bias by not only prosecutors but judges as well. See Editorial, Real Crime, Real Punishment, USA TODAY, Mar.
1, 1994, at 10A (discussing findings of country-wide bias study). For instance, "the
Colorado Supreme Court Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts indicated that
41% of judges believed that juries give sexual assault victims less credibility than
other crime victims." S. REP. No. 102-97, at 47 (1991).
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portionately discouraged from utilizing state resources to vindicate their
rights. State indifference, failure to provide adequate law enforcement resources and the lack of will to enforce rape laws encourage rape to proceed unhindered. This is the state action that denies women the equal
protection of the laws.
After four years of hearings on the matter beginning in 1990, Congress made findings regarding women and criminal law enforcement. In a
series of congressional hearings, attorneys, victim advocates, health care
practitioners, judges, victims themselves and others testified to a chronic
problem of under-enforcement of the criminal law in areas affecting women. 167 Congress heard extensive testimony that women who had been
sexually victimized were considered at fault, unharmed or not credible.16 8
Based on these hearings, Congress determined that state laws and criminal
justice systems, deeply infected with gender bias, had failed to investigate,
prosecute or otherwise remedy many crimes of rape and other forms of
violence against women. 169 Congress concluded that the "overwhelming
enforcement failure fuels gender-based violence and allows it to continue
1 70
unchecked."
D.

Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer

States are such chronic bad actors in the area of violence against women that most women who suffer rape have no faith that the state will take
their claims of victimization seriously. As a result, the vast majority of wo17 1
men do not report to state authorities when they suffer sexual violence.
167. See S. REP. No. 102-97, at 47 (offering congressional testimony demonstrating that women do not receive equal treatment under criminal laws).
168. See id. (noting generalized perceptions of criminal justice system regarding raped women).
169. See Pamela Coukos, Deconstructingthe Debate Over Gender and Hate Crimes
Legislation, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 11, 37 (1999).
170. Id.
171. According to Catherine MacKinnon, the justice system's failure is a product of both the content and the administration of present laws. See MacKinnon,
supra note 63, at 142-43 (criticizing rape law and police administration of rape
law). For example, because most rape victims share a degree of acquaintance with
their attackers, one can trace the ubiquity of sexual assault to state law conferring
on men latitude to force sex on women according to the degree of intimacy men
have, or have had, with their victim. See id. at 142 (observing that marital rape
exception is most explicit example of state law granting impunity due to relationship between rapist and victim). Furthermore, the routine harassment justice officials subject women to when reporting sexual assault and the pervasive police
practice of "unfounding" rape claims make women feel violated by their encounters with the justice system and ultimately discourages reporting all together.
See id. at 143 (describing "second rape" phenomenon). Indeed, aware of the fact
that the criminal justice system does not prosecute most reported rapes and that
most prosecuted rapes do not result in conviction, women do not report most
sexual assaults. See id. at 142 (stating that victims reasonably anticipate that authorities will not believe them or will humiliate them). Accordingly, the present body
of law has failed to provide equal protection to women and requires a conceptual
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According to the Bureau ofJustice Statistics, rape is the violent crime least
likely to be reported to the police. 172 Eighty-four percent of rape victims
do not report having been raped to the police.17A woman's judgment about the costs and benefits of legal intervention is shaped by her perceptions of likely institutional reactions. 174 Women know what has happened to rape victims in the past and what often
continues to happen today: embarrassing questions by the police and prosecutors in private and by defense attorneys in public about a victim's sexual history, the implicit argument that the woman assumed the risk of
sexual violence by looking or acting "provocatively" and the focus on the
woman's failure to employ sufficient resistance against the man she now
175
claims attacked her.
Studies provide support for the notion that this "prejudicial handling
by the criminal justice system has increased nonreporting." 176 The decision to report a sexual assault is influenced by prevalent perceptions of
police hostility toward sexual assault victims. 17 7 Indeed, victims know that

reporting will result in secondary victimization from negative treatment by
overhaul. See id. at 138-39 (noting that laws defining rape were drafted by men
long before women had right to vote).
172. See Ronet Bachman, Is the Glass Half Empty or HalfFull, 22 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 81, 94 (1995) (stating that rape is violent crime least likely to be reported to

police).
173. See

NAT'L VICTIM CTR., supra note 1, at 6 (1992).
174. See generally Pino & Meier, supra note 71 (analyzing underlying causes of

failure to report sexual victimization in men and women).
175. See id. at 980.
176. Alan J. Lizotte, The Uniqueness of Rape: Reporting Assaultive Violence to the
Police, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 169, 185 (1985). Independent of a host of other accuracy problems with self-reported surveys, one should be cautioned from relying on
the results of previous surveys about why crime victims chose not to report their
victimization to the police because they did not focus specifically on the extent to
which a woman's perception that the criminaljustice system will not take her claim
seriously is the reason she does not report. The results of some surveys, neverthe-

less, are suggestive. One study found that sixty percent of rape victims did not
report having been raped to the police because of their low expectations regarding
the police response. See generally QUEEN'S BENCH FOUND., RAPE-PREVENTION AND
RESISTANCE (1976) (identifying reasons for unreported rapes). Another study
found that thirteen percent of rape victims did not report having been raped to
the police because the police are inefficient, ineffective or biased. See U.S. DEP'T
OFJUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HIGHLIGHTS FROM 20 YEARS OF SURVEYING
CRIME VICTIMS 33 (1993). Another study found four percent had no faith that the

police could do anything about the matter, twenty-eight percent say it was a private
matter. Eleven percent said they had no faith the police would do anything about
the matter. Seventeen percent were afraid of reprisals from the offender, believ-

ing that the police could not effectively protect them. And forty percent are other.
See

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIO11 (1994).
177. See generally Rape Reporting to the Police: Exploring the Social Psychological
Impact of Persuasive Campaign on Cognitions, Attitudes, Normative Expectations and Reporting Intentions, 2 INT'L REV. VICTOMOLOGY 277 (1993) (assessing impact of perRONET BACHMAN,

LENCE AGAINST WOMEN

ceived positive behavioral
violence).

outcomes on victims'
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police who harp on irrelevant details and confront victims with disbelief
and distrust. 178 Unlike other crime victims, rape victims tend to anticipate
how they will be treated and the likely outcome of the case before they
decide whether to report the crime to the police.17 9 As a result, rape victims "tend to only report 'dead bang' cases. That is, they tend to report to
the police only when the probability of conviction is high. And, of course,
they tend not to report when it is low."

80

Christy Brzonkala knew she did not have a "dead bang case." She was
raped by two acquaintances who were football players. She did not report
the rapes to the police. If one examines the reasons she offered for not
reporting, one can see the way the biased common law rape requirements
were operational, even in her own mind. According to Brzonkala's complaint, she believed that "criminal prosecution was impossible because she
had not preserved any physical evidence of the rape."' 81 Her analysis mirrors the common law requirements of prompt complaint and corroboration that no longer formally apply but continue to direct the discretionary
decisions of police and prosecutors. In all likelihood, Brzonkala anticipated correctly that Virginia police and prosecutors would not have pursued her case because she was an acquaintance rape victim who had no
physical evidence to corroborate her story. She had waited too long to
report. These legal rules-corroboration and prompt complaint-also influenced the state grand jury that, two years later, refused to indict Morri182
son and Crawford on rape charges.
Despite decades of legal reform of the formal law of rape, there has
not been a substantial change in the proportion of victims who are willing
to report having been raped to the police. 183 From the 1970s to the

1990s, there was only a "slight (approximately 10%) increase in the pro178. See id. at 282. The study also demonstrated that a persuasive communication campaign could stimulate victim reporting by increasing the perceived
probability of positive outcomes and in strengthening the perceived normative expectations to report. See id. at 292. To that end, the study showed a video of police
officers in initial meetings with victims, treating the victims in a positive manner,
not questioning the integrity of the victims, responding to attendant fears and
helplessness of victims with empathy and providing clear procedural information
to victims. See id. at 286. The information resulted in a statistically significant positive shift in attitude toward reporting and thereby suggested that underreporting
results from negative perceptions and expectations associated with police treatment of victims. See id.
179. See id.

180. Id.
181. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 954 (4th
Cir. 1997), affd, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
182. See No Action on Hokie Players, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 11, 1996, at B6 (stating that
grand jury refused to indict Morrison and Crawford on rape charges).
183. See Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 162, at 573 ("statutory rape law
reform has not had a very substantial effect on .

.

. victim behavior"). Despite

better overall education and recent penal reforms, negative social attitudes about
sexual crime victims-i.e., that "she asked for it"-continue. Wise, supra note 78,
at 27.
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portion of women who reported being the victim of a rape."' 8 4 Of all the
variables that influence the victim's decision to report having been raped
to police, the relationship between the offender and the victim appears to
be the most important.18 5 Women are less likely to report acquaintance
rape situations, and eighty percent of rape victims are acquaintance rape
victims. 186 The historical police response to rape victims, particularly ac-

quaintance rape victims, has created powerful psychological barriers to
rape reporting, such that, even as external social factors change, women
continue to experience anxiety, embarrassment and self-blame as a result
of sexual victimization.

87

1

Three related facts, then, are key: 1) historical and continued unequal state action regarding gender violence; 2) women's justifiable pessimism about states' willingness to respond equally to the violence they
suffer; and 3) women's consequent reluctance to report gender violence
to state actors. In response to the chronic denial of their equal protection
rights, women have little to no faith in states to afford them a remedy.
The reality of state action, then, extends further than how state actors respond to those (relatively few) women who do report having been raped.
States deter women from turning to their authority because the protection
they offer is unequal.
This is the scope of the section 1 violation: the vast majority of women
have no legal state remedy for suffering rape. They have little hope of
legal vindication against their assailants in their state criminal justice systems. They have no way to force states to pursue their legal vindication.
These facts have important implications for what Congress may do under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy this section 1 violation.
184. Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 162, at 574.
185. See generally Linda S. Williams, The Classic Rape: When Do Victims Report?,
31 Soc. PROBS. 459 (1984) (identifying factors correlated with reporting rapes).
186. "A close relationship usually results in a less violent assault, which in turn
means less likelihood of injury and medical treatment." Id. Without corroboration of the crime, the victim is less likely to be believed by state actors.
187. See generally Renee L. Binder, M.D., Why Women Don't Report Sexual Assault,

42J.

CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY

437 (1981) (identifying reasons for not reporting sexual

assaults); see also BACHiMAN, supra note 176, at 81 (recognizing need for women to
report sexual victimization to increase deterrent effect on would-be rapists). Bachman states:
Because the majority of rape victims from this sample did not.., report
their victimization to the police, aggressive attempts should be made to

make both the reporting and adjudication process of rape less threatening to victims ....More generally, educational efforts should continue to
be directed at aligning societal perceptions regarding rape with contemporary legal statutes that more equitably treat rape like other forms of
violent crime. In doing this, the historical stigma attached to being a
rape victim may further abate, and public attitudes concerning rape
might one day catch up to legal norms. With these efforts made, perhaps

the reluctance of victims to report and prosecute cases of rape will continue to be reduced.
BACHMAN,

supra note 176, at 81.
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Under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the power
to authorize women to sue their assailants in federal court. Because the
criminal justice system deters women from reporting the violence they suffer to state actors, a remedy against these non-state actors is most
appropriate.
IV. MORWSO'S SECTION 5 ANALYSIS

In Morrison, the United States Supreme Court concluded that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact § 13981 of VAWA under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Morrison Court's analysis of
section 5 is no model of judicial clarity. It is fair to say, however, that the
Court concluded that Congress exceeded its authority under section 5 for
three reasons. First, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state action,
s8
not private conduct, and violence against women is private conduct.
Second, § 13981 fails the congruence and proportionality test for section 5
enactments 18 9 as announced by the Court in the recent case of City of
Boerne v. Flores.190 Finally, § 13981 provides a uniform remedy for violence
against women, but congressional findings indicated that the problem of
unequal protection of the law did not exist in all or even most of the
states. 91 The Court was wrong on all three counts, as each failed to grapple with the true scope of the section 1 violation and the power granted to
Congress by section 5 to remedy that violation.
A.

State Action

The Court began its analysis of the section 5 issue by identifying the
"first and foremost" limit on congressional power under section 5-the
"time-honored principle" that the Fourteenth Amendment proscribes only
state action.' 92 The Court reaffirmed that the Amendment "erects no
shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." 193 The Court concluded that § 13981 was not a constitutional exercise of congressional authority under section 5 because it addressed the
188. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (stating that
Fourteenth Amendment's applicability is limited to state actions).
189. See id. at 625-26 (stating that § 13981 does not meet congruence and
proportionality test).
190. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
191. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (noting Congress' findings that discrimination against gender-motivated targets is not present in all states).
192. See id. at 621 ("Foremost among these limitations is the time-honored
principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state
action.").
193. Id.; see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (declaring unconstitutional public accommodation provision of Civil Rights Act of 1875 because
Fourteenth Amendment did not protect against "[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights"); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883) (invalidating statute
because it was directed "exclusively against the action of private persons, without
reference to the laws of the State or their administration by her officers").
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private actions of individuals who committed violence against women, instead of addressing the state action itself. 19 4 Because it was not directed at
a state or state actor, the Court found that § 13981 impermissibly targeted
195
private individuals.
In the Civil Rights Cases in 1883, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the argument that Congress had the authority under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to protect a person's civil rights from intrusion by private actors. 19" The Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amend194. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (stating that § 13981 was directed at private
actors who have committed gender-based crimes and not states or state actors).
The Court began by noting that Congress' power under section 5 includes the
power to "prohibit conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and [to] intrude
into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States."' Id. at 619
(quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 518). Although the grant of enforcement power under
section 5 appears broad, the Court has recognized textual and constitutional limits
on the amendment. See id.
Brzonkala argued that the state action requirement had been overruled by the
Court. See id. at 622. In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), two justices
expressed the view, in separate concurring opinions, that Congress could prohibit
actions by private individuals, even in the absence of state action. See Morrison, 529
U.S. at 622 (summarizing concurring opinions in Guest). Justice Brennan, author
of one of the concurring opinions, stated that the Civil Rights Cases were incorrectly
decided. See id. at 622-23 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that Congress can
regulate actions of private individuals) (citing Guest, 383 U.S. at 774). Justice
Clark, author of the other concurring opinion, stated that Congress could
"punis [h] all conspiracies-with or without state action." Id. at 623 (Clark, J., concurring) (citing Guest, 383 U.S. at 762).
Brzonkala also relied on District of Columbia v. Carter,409 U.S. 418 (1973), for

the proposition that the state action requirement had been overruled. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 624 (discussing holding in Carter). The Morrison Court rejected
Brzonkala's reliance on Guest because the case involved state action; therefore, the
statements that Congress could prohibit actions by private individuals were dicta.
See id. at 623 (stating that actual state involvement in case "eliminated any need to
decide 'the threshold level that state action must attain in order to create rights
under the Equal Protection Clause"'). The Morrison Court stated that although
Justice Brennan's opinion was "reasoned," Justice Clark's opinion was "naked
dicta." See id. (rejecting Brzonkala's argument that Guest eliminated state action
requirement). The Court then rejected Brzonkala's reliance on Carter because the
opinion contained only a footnote reference to the dicta in Guest. See id. ("This
litany is of course entirely dicta, and in any event cannot rise above its source.").
The Morrison Court adhered to the doctrine of stare decisis because the decisions in Harrisand the CivilRights Cases have remained good law for over a century.
See id. (describing why Morrison Court refused to consider challenges to Fourteenth
Amendment state action requirement).
195. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 ("Section 13981 is not aimed at proscribing
discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe; it is directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have
committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias."). According to the Court, the
civil remedy directed at private individuals made § 13981 "unlike any of the § 5
remedies that we have previously upheld." Id. But see generally Sally Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (2000) (criticizing Brzonkala Court's Fourteenth Amendment analysis).
196. See generally Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (holding Constitution did not
authorize Congress to regulate conduct of private actors for purpose of protecting
against intrusion of individual rights).
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ment protected an individual from an official "abrogation and denial
1 97
of rights," and not merely the "invasion" of the person's civil rights.
According to the Court, only the state could breech an individual's rights
in a way that would implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. 98 Although
scholars and subsequent Supreme Court Justices have challenged the
Court's reasoning, 199 the Civil Rights Cases have not been over197. See id. at 11, 17-18 ("It is state action of a particular character that is
prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the
amendment."). The Court stated:
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is
simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an invasion of the
rights of the injured party, it is true, whether they affect his person, his
property, or his reputation; but if not sanctioned in some way by the
State, or not done under State authority, his rights remain in full force,
and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for
redress.
Id. at 17.
198. See id. at 18 ("This abrogation and denial of rights, for which the states
alone were or could be responsible, was the great seminal and fundamental wrong
which was intended to be remedied. And the remedy to be provided must necessarily be predicated upon that wrong. It must assume that in the cases provided for,
the evil or wrong actually committed rests upon some State law or State authority
for its excuse and perpetration.").
199. See, e.g., Hayward D. Reynolds, Deconstructing State Action: The Politics of
State Action, 20 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 847, 854-55 (1994) (arguing for abolishment of
state action doctrine). Professor Hayward argues that,
The infamous state action requirement, which was politically crafted by
the United States Supreme Court in 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases, must be
relegated to the trash heap if the United States of America is even modestly serious about our professed social and constitutional ideals of equality and liberty.
Id. at 847; see also MacKinnon, supra note 63, at 153 (asserting Court was wrong in
stating that "all statutes under the Fourteenth Amendment do or must address
only state action"). Citing the Klu Klux Klan Act and testimony from the congressional hearings on the Fourteenth Amendment, MacKinnon asserts that, at the
time of enactment, Congress intended the Amendment to protect against privately
executed deprivations that the State, "by its neglect or want of power" was unable
to prevent or properly punish. Id. at 154 (quoting congressional testimony from
amendment's hearing). MacKinnon argues that the distinction between public
and private as drawn by the Court limited equality rights to the narrowest of official violations. See id. at 171 (concluding that Morrison is official national decision
that "what men do to women in private will be beyond the reach of public
authority").
The Court in Morrison also indicated that the states' lax enforcement of ciminal and tort laws regarding violence against women did not distinguish this case
from those present in Harrisor the Civil Rights Cases. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621.
The Court summarized Harris as invalidating § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871the "law exceeded Congress' § 5 power because the law was 'directed exclusively
against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State, or
their administration by [its] officers." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621 (quoting Harris,
106 U.S. at 640). The Court summarized the Civil Rights Cases as holding "that the
public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which applied to
purely private conduct, were beyond the scope of the § 5 enforcement power." Id.
The Court noted that both situations involved discriminatory state enforcement of
existing state laws requiring equality of treatment. See id. (noting similarity be-
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turned. 211
Section 13981 of VAWA, however, is not based on the notion that
private actors who rape women violate women's Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Congress found that state actors (not private actors) pervasively
deny women equal protection by their discretionary decisions regarding
complaints of violence motivated by gender animus.

20 1

The discretionary

decisions made by state actors such as police and prosecutors in their official capacities are state action. As the Supreme Court noted in 1948,
"That the action of state courts and of judicial officers in their official
capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which has long been estab20 2
lished by the decisions of this Court."
Police and prosecutors' denial of equal protection to those women
who do report deters the vast majority of other women from reporting
violence motivated by gender animus that they suffer. Private violence
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. But state action does, and
the state action in this case also deters women from engaging the state
itself. To remedy this problem, then, one cannot focus exclusively on
those cases in which a woman reports that she was raped and then is dealt
with unequally by state actors. For every one woman who reports having
been raped and is dismissed, disbelieved or disgraced by state actors, there
are four others who choose not to report to the police in an effort to avoid
her fate. 20 3 So legislation targeted at state actors would not remedy the
problem. A more complete understanding of why a traditional state action analysis is inadequate when dealing with violence against women
emerges with an analysis of the congruence and proportionality question
under section 5.
tween Harrisand Civil Rights Cases). The Court also stated that the purpose of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 was the same as the purpose behind VAWA-for the federal government to step in where the states have failed. See id. (noting similarity
between Civil Rights Act of 1875 and VAWA).
200. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1964)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (stating preference for finding § 5 of Fourteenth Amendment as proper authority for Civil Rights Act of 1964); id. at 291 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (stating that Congress had power under both Commerce Clause and
§ 5 of Fourteenth Amendment to enact Civil Rights Act of 1964); Balkin, supra
note 60, at A23 (arguing that Court's opinion in Civil Rights Cases was "overtly
racist").
201. See S. REP No. 102-197, at 43-44 (1991) (internal quotations omitted)
(citing Gender Bias Task Force Reports from seventeen states). According to
testimony:
"Study after study commissioned by the highest courts of the States ...
has concluded that crimes disproportionately affecting women are often
treated less seriously than comparable crimes against men. Collectively
these reports provide overwhelming evidence that gender bias permeates
the court system and that women are most often its victims." Id.
202. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
203. For a discussion of this statistic, see supra note 174 and accompanying

text.
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Congruence and Proportionality

The Supreme Court also held that Congress was not authorized to
enact § 13981 under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
provision did not meet the "congruence and proportionality" requirements for legislation enacted under section 5.204 Under these requirements, Congress has no authority to change or redefine the substantive
scope of what section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits. 20 5 The
Supreme Court has held that the ability to define what section 1 prohibits
resides within the exclusive province of the courts. 206 By enacting
§ 13981, however, Congress made no attempt to redefine the scope of
what section 1 prohibits. 20 7 Section 13981 of VAWA does not create or
establish a right to equal protection against the actions of private individuals. Congressional findings supporting § 13981 of VAWA focused on the
kind of state action that should be at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment-unequal protection that is motivated by gender stereotype and
bias. This is a section 1 problem caused by state action. By enacting
§ 13981 of VAWA, Congress sought to redress the section 1 problem.
VAWA did not define private violence against women as a violation of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because states pervasively deny women equal protection against gender-motivated violence and further deter
women from even reporting to them, federal suits against private individuals are the most appropriate remedy under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, § 13981 of VAWA operates under section 5 in order to remedy the
section 1 violation.
For remedial legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to be congruent and proportional, the Supreme Court has emphasized that it must "be adapted to the mischief and wrong which the
[Fourteenth] Amendment was intended to provide against." 20 8 The
Court clarified that the "appropriateness of remedial measures must be
considered in light of the evil presented. '2° 9 In terms of violence against
204. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625-26 (stating that § 13981 does not meet congruence and proportionality test).
205. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) (stating that Congress is not authorized to define what Constitution prohibits); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999) (same);
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) ("Congress has [no] power to
decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the states."),
206. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620 (noting that Congress is limited in its power
under section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment).
207. See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 64, at § 6:24. Cass Sunsein argues that VAWA's civil rights provision did not redefine the substantive prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress found that victims of gendermotivated crimes were denied equal protection by bias and discrimination in the
criminal justice system. Correcting this differential treatment arising out of gender discrimination is clearly a Fourteenth Amendment concern. See id.
208. Fores, 521 U.S. at 532 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13).
209. Id. at 530. The context of the problem that Congress is addressing is
important to the judicial analysis of the legislative remedy because "[s]trong inea-
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women, the "mischief and wrong" that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to provide against is the unequal protection states afford women
against rape and battery. 210 Here, the "evil presented" is the pervasive
lack of legal remedy women have for the gender-motivated violence they
suffer. Women believe, with good reason, that the state will not provide
them with equal protection and so do not report having been assaulted to
the police. The remedy, then, has to be adapted to that mischief.
The Court in Morrison indicated that the most appropriate remedy
would be for rape victims to sue those state actors who deny them equal
protection. 2 I Limiting relief to suits against state actors would be underinclusive, as well as incongruent and disproportionate to the evil
presented, because it would provide potential relief only to those sixteen
percent of rape victims who report having been raped to the police and
who are denied equal protection. A congruent and proportional remedy
to the evil presented would provide potential relief to the vast majority of
rape victims, those eighty-four percent of rape victims who do not report
having been raped to the police. These victims are deterred from reporting because of state action.
The most congruent and proportional remedy, then, is to afford women the opportunity to pursue legal relief against their abusers in federal
court. Giving victims the ability to sue in federal court is adapted to the
evil presented that women have no legal remedy at the state level. As SenatorJoseph Biden, author of VAWA, argued, "Section 13981 is calibrated
precisely to address the very constitutional violation that Congress identified-the states' failure to afford victims of gender-based violence an opportunity to vindicate their rights on par with other victims of serious
violent crime."'' 2 Here, a remedy against private actors is particularly appropriate when chronic bad action on the part of the state deters women
from engaging the state, despite suffering gender-motivated violent crime.
The Morrison Court, however, declared that § 13981 of VAWA was not
congruent and proportional because it "visits no consequence whatever on
any Virginia public official involved in investigating or prosecuting
Brzonkala's assault."2 13 Limiting relief to suing state actors is unnecessasures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one." Id. Although not determinative, a legislative record showing
that Congress "respond[ed] to a history of 'widespread and persisting deprivation
of constitutional rights' of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic section five legislation" may lead a court to determine that the legislation is a
constitutional exercise of Congress' section 5 authority. College Savings Bank, 527
U.S. at 646 (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 526).
210. See generally,Jennifer S. Hendricks, Women and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 51 (1998) (encouraging Congress to utilize power
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to promote equal citizenship for
women).
211. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (stating that § 13981's civil remedy was deficient because it was "not aimed at proscribing discrimination by [state] officials").
212. Biden, supra note 59, at 40.
213. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626.
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rily severe, however, because it would require a woman to report a rape to
the police first-a prospect most rape victims dread-before she could
have a claim under section 1 or an authorized remedy under section 5.
Because states deter reporting by their bad actions when women do report, reporting itself should not be a prerequisite for obtaining relief
under section 5. Rational actors respond to the prospect of futile engagement with the state. It cannot be that when a state is so bad that it deters
victims' engagement with the formal mechanisms of police power the state
thereby manages to circumvent the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Moreover, women already can sue state actors for violations of their
equal protection rights, namely under § 1983.214 By and large, when they
make these claims, they do not win. The limited potential relief under
§ 1983 reveals why suits against state actors are incongruent and disproportionate to the section 1 violation here. To make a § 1983 claim, a vic2 15
tim must allege a violation of the Constitution under color of state law.
Because most women do not report having been raped by state actors, they
have no state actor to sue under § 1983. Individual claims against state
actors would only provide potential relief for those women who fall within
the exception, not the rule. Even for the exceptional victim who does
report, it is difficult to bring claims against individual state actors who
function with broad discretion. Ostensibly neutral discretionary decisions
by police and prosecutors hide intent-bias against women that is grounded
in the historical common law of rape. As Senator Biden argued, "an individualized showing of state constitutional violations in each and every case
would have imposed an undue-and likely impossible-burden of proof
on the very victims whose access to the legal system Congress intended to
216
ease, not restrict."
Finally, even if suits against state actors were congruent and proportional, suits against private actors also still would be congruent and proportional to the section 1 violation. 2 17 Under the text of section 5,
Congress has the authority to implement all "appropriate" remedial
legislation.
C.

National Problem

Independent of the state action and the congruence and proportionality doctrines, the United States Supreme Court also ruled in Morrison
that § 13981 was unconstitutional remedial legislation because § 13981 applied uniformly across the nation, despite the fact that, as the Court put it,
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2001).
215. See id. (creating cause of action for deprivation of "rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution").
216. Biden, supra note 59, at 42.
217. See generally Evan H. Caminker, Symposium on New Directions in Federalism:
Private Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rv. 1351 (2000)
("Section 5's language does not limit Congress's potential regulatory targets.").
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"Congress' findings indicate that the problem of discrimination against
the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or even
most States." 2 18 The Court did not provide any support for this assertion.
The assertion was not how Congress saw the problem. Congress saw states'
denial of equal protection against gender-motivated violence as a perva2 9
sive, national problem. 1
But the Court's statement may reveal the limited nature of what it was
willing to consider a section 1 violation. What, exactly, was the Court referring to as "the problem of discrimination against the victims of gendermotivated crimes" that, it said, "does not exist in all States, or even most
States?" 220 In all likelihood, it was referring to the biased common law
rules in rape law, including the marital rape exemption, which no longer
formally exists in all states or even most states.2 2 1 The Court was looking
at state criminal codes for evidence of discrimination that violated section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 222 Because most states have made significant changes in their rape codes, including abolishing the marital rape
exemption, the Court likely concluded there is no nationwide denial of
equal protection.
Such a conclusion, however, is unduly formalistic. Evidence that women are denied equal protection cannot be gleaned exclusively from statute books. Equal protection refers not only to the criminal code. It refers
to the decisions by state actors in theirjobs that go beyond the written law.
As the Supreme Court has explained, "state action in violation of the
Amendment's provisions is equally repugnant to the constitutional commands whether directed by state statute or taken by a judicial official in
the absence of a statute." 22 3 Discretionary decisions by state actors constitute state action and can violate section 1 just as a discriminatory code
would. Although states have cleaned up their acts on paper, when one
looks at the discretionary decisions by state actors nationwide, a picture of
prejudiced intransigence regarding violence against women re-emerges.
That intransigence is a national problem, regardless of variations in state
codes, and it violates section 1.

218. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626.
219. See S. REP No. 102-97, at 43-44 (1991) (internal quotations omitted) (cit-

ing Gender Bias Task Force Reports from seventeen states). According to testimony, "[s] tudy after study commissioned by the highest courts of the States ... has
concluded that crimes disproportionately affecting women are often treated less
seriously than comparable crimes against men. Collectively these reports provide
overwhelming evidence that gender bias permeates the court system and that women are most often its victims." Id.
220. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626.
221. For a discussion of the marital rape exemption, see supra notes 96-98 and
accompanying text.
222. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625 (scrutinizing state criminal laws).
223. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 16 (1948).
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Federalism

There are federalism concerns raised by § 13981 of VAWA. 224 In the
United States, the authority of the federal government is one of enumerated powers and is limited to the powers specifically granted to it by the
United States Constitution. The state governments, however, hold a more
general police power to protect the health, safety and general welfare of
state residents. A state action is invalid only if it violates a limitation imposed by the Constitution. Issues of federalism arise when either a state
government or the national government acts outside its respective sphere
of power.
Federalism-based limits on the national government protect jurisdictional values and sovereignty values. 2 25 The jurisdictional values, addressing the division of lawmaking authority between the federal and state
governments, protect the states from federal intrusion into areas of states'
"proper sphere of exclusive regulatoryjurisdiction." 22 6 Sovereignty values,
concerning relations between the federal government and states, protect
"the states' status and dignity as a co-equal and original sovereign. '227 Section 13981 of VAWA violates neither the jurisdictional nor the sovereignty
228
principles of federalism.
224. The value of federalism as interpreted by the Court has been criticized.
See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 63, at 136 (criticizing Morrison Court's "specific
notion of federalism"). MacKinnon observes that deference to federalism is espe-

cially odious in regard to equality rights because women did not contribute to the
configuration of federalism's hierarchy with the inviolable "private" being a subprovince of the "local." See id. at 169 (observing that federalism's distrust of centralized power was arranged before women had political voice). Federalism speaks
in the voice of men who trust their own power but not the power of other men
over them. See id. (referring to Fourth Circuit's preamble finding VAWA unconsti-

tutional). The experience of women, and other subordinated groups, is not to
distrust centralized power but to distrust the system of limited and dispersed power
that has preserved their inequality. See id. (analogizing to experience of African
Americans whose slavery was maintained by "states' rights").
225. See Caminker, supra note 217, at 1364-65 (discussing structural principles
of federalism). Federalism also protects the "effectiveness of both state and federal
governments as representative bodies .. " Brzonkala v. Va. Polytech Inst. & State
Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 927 (4th Cir. 1999) (MotzJ., dissenting) (arguing that political accountability of elected officials "suffers when citizens are confused about
which sphere of government is responsible for the regulation of an activity") (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992)). Judge Motz concluded
that § 13981, "which legislates in an area of traditional congressional expertise,
and does not interfere with or usurp any state authority, fits comfortably within the
proper federalism-based limits on Congress's Commerce Clause power." Id. at
925.
226. Caminker, supra note 217, at 1364.
227. Id. at 1364-65.
228. See id. at 1359 ("Private remediation for unconstitutional state action is
consistent with the constitutional text, Supreme Court precedent, and principles
of federalism that appropriately guide Section 5's interpretation.").
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Congress included substantial procedural limits on § 13981 of
VAWA. 229 In response to federalism concerns raised by both federal and
state judges, Congress defined the concurrent federal and state jurisdiction permitted under VAWA, limited removal jurisdiction under the statute and barred federal courts from exercising pendent jurisdiction over
230
related state law claims that involved traditional family law matters.
Given what Congress found about the violation of section 1, it could
have intruded more heavily on state turf by, for instance, scaling back the
doctrines of immunity under § 1983.231 Pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may have been able to prohibit discriminatory state enforcement of facially neutral laws and authorize a wider scope
of actions for damages against the states or state officials. 232 Allowing suits
in federal courts against private actors is much less disruptive to state lawmaking authority than the congressional regulation of state conduct
23 3
would have been.
For instance, § 13981 of VAWA threatens the status and dignity of the
states less than the decision to diminish the immunity doctrines of
229. See generally, Nourse, Where Violence, supra note 59, at 282-92 (providing

detailed legislative history of VAWA).
230. See id. at 283-84 (discussing procedural limitations of VAWA). These procedural limits initially were designed by the Senate Judiciary Committee. See id.
(same); MacKinnon, supra note 63, at 136 (stating that Morrison is "high-water
mark" to date of Supreme Court jurisprudence deferring to notions of federalism). VAWA did not duplicate state law in theory, design or remedy; rather, it
granted federalism friendly concurrentjurisdiction. See MacKinnon, supra note 63,
at 149 (noting that VAWA only supplemented civil options while leaving state criminal remedies in place).
231. See Biden, supra note 59, at 40-41 (suggesting alternative course Congress
could have taken in drafting portions of § 13981). Biden stated:
Congress was not required ... to enact a far more sweeping and intrusive
remedy for state failings, such as preempting the states' criminal and tort
laws altogether, authorizing lawsuits directly against states or their officials, extending federal jurisdiction over family law matters, denying
state's concurrent jurisdiction over actions brought tinder § 13981, or by
regulating all violence against women, regardless of the presence or absence of gender-based animus.
Id.
232. See id. (stating that Congress could have taken different approach to regulate conduct of states and state actors).
233. See Caminker, supra note 217, at 1366 (arguing that evaluation of congressional interference with state police power should not turn on whether
remediation scheme is aimed at public or private actors). Caminker states:
[T]he potential preemptive scope of private remediation is no greater
than the potential preemptive scope of conventional public remediation.
It is true that congressional regulation of private conduct can, and often
does, trump state law and thereby displace the state's erstwhile regulatory
role. But congressional regulation of state conduct does much the same
thing.
Id.; see also id. at 1367-68 (hypothesizing that states would be forced to alter enforcement of their laws to achieve equal protection for men and women).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss5/1

42

Anderson: Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer: Violence against Wo

20011

WOMEN

Do

NOT REPORT

§ 1983.234 Facilitating more suits against the state might invite federal judicial scrutiny into state law enforcement activities, resulting in injunctions
or federal supervision of state authorities. 2 35 Because § 13981 of VAWA is
less intrusive into states' spheres of power than congressional alternatives,
it does not infringe on any of the core concerns of federalism. As between
authorizing suits against private individuals and authorizing those against
state actors, § 13981 .of VAWA chose the alternative that is kinder to the
states.
If one prizes federalism and states interests, one should applaud
§ 13981 of VAWA. Remedies against assailants do not infringe on any of
the core concerns of federalism. In fact, VAWA treaded lightly on the
states and did not threaten their status or dignity. It is no wonder that
236
thirty-six states agreed, signing a brief in support of § 13981 of VAWA.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Morrison case is over and women lost.2 3 7 But that fact points to
the reality that a re-evaluation of the state action doctrine under section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment is now in order. When states act to deny
women equal protection over time by ignoring or dismissing violence that
is motivated by gender animus, women rationally have no faith that the
state will take the violence against them seriously. The state is not where
234. See id. at 1370 ("Section 5 public remediation poses absolutely no threat
whatsoever to the status/dignitary values underlying recent federalism decisions.
But, of course, private remediation by definition also poses absolutely no threat to
these values.").
235. See id. (suggesting consequences of allowing additional suits against
state).
236. See Brief of the States of Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and
Wisconsin, and the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Puerto Rico, as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29) (advocating remedial scheme of § 13981).
237. As Catherine MacKinnon puts it,
[A]gainst an historical backdrop of the use of federalism to deny racial
equality and enforce white supremacy, Morrison can be seen to employ
ostensibly gender-neutral tools to achieve substantive victory for the social
institution of male dominance. Read substantively, Morrison is not an abstract application of neutral institutional priorities, but a refusal to allow
Congress to redress violence against women ....
MacKinnon, supra note 63, at 136. She goes on to say that,
In Morrison, the Court revived and deployed against women the odious
"states' rights" doctrine, the principal legal argument for the maintenance of slavery ....
Combined with the Court's equal protection jurisprudence[,] . . . Morrison leaves women who are denied the equal

protection of criminal laws against battering and rape without adequate
legal recourse.
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most women turn when they are sexually violated, primarily because women do not want to be hurt even more. They do not want to face the
disbelief, accusations of guilt and disregard they have come to expect from
state actors. The vast majority of women do not report to police the sexual
violence they suffer. Even when women do not report, however, states
have acted to deny those women equal protection because of what happened before. This insight is what a re-evaluation of the interaction between the state and victims of sexual violence reveals.
Allowing those relatively few women who do report to sue state actors
will not help those women, much greater in number, whose rights are also
violated by bad state actions who choose not to report. Such a narrow
solution, suggested by the Court in Morrison, will not address the broader
reality of women's lack of a legal remedy for the sexual violence they suffer. Only allowing women to make claims in federal court against private
actors who commit gender-motivated violence would provide women with
a remedy that is congruent and proportional to the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment that women suffer.
Critics might argue that I am proposing an end-run around the normal rules applicable to section 5 legislation. Sexual violence, however, is a
context in which citizens interact with legal actors in a way that is particularly sensitive to the prospect of futile engagement with the state. When
viewed in this light, the normal rules of what Congress can reach must be
re-evaluated, and narrow prescriptions that are no better than the status
quo will not suffice.
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